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ABSTRACT 
 
Prime, Maxwell Working Hard or Hardly Working? An Examination of 
Work Relief in Upstate New York, 1931-1943. 
 
Becoming the first U.S. state to provide direct funding and administrative support 
for work relief to its cities, counties and townships; with the creation of the Temporary 
Emergency Relief Administration in November of 1931, New York took its first steps in 
what would become a long tradition of work relief in the state. However, existing 
academic examinations of work relief in upstate New York in large part ignore activities 
in the state’s upstate region in favor of higher profile operations in New York City. This 
thesis attempts to chart the rise and developmental trajectory of work relief in upstate 
New York between the years of 1931 and 1943. 
To accomplish this task, this report examines the genesis of New York work relief 
under the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration, expansion under the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, and maturation under the Works Progress 
Administration.  The investigation of these agencies has revealed that work relief in 
upstate New York during the Great Depression operated through a continuum of 
programs, spanning from the establishment of the New York State TERA in late 
September of 1931 to the discontinuation of the WPA in June of 1943. In the upstate 
region, between late 1935 and 1938 the WPA built on legacies established by the TERA, 
FERA, and Civil Works Administration in order to orchestrate a substantial shift of 
unemployed individuals from local relief rolls to federally funded, locally sponsored 
work projects tailored to the specific needs of the region’s municipalities and 
unemployed populations.   However, the ultimate success of the Administration in the 
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upstate area was sacrificed by federal budgetary cuts and regulations over the course of 
1938 and 1939 which, resulting in the reversal of positive trends established in 1936, and 
sparking discontent among relief populations in the state’s large industrial communities.  
Despite a renaissance in the WPA’s activities in the early 1940’s, the result of increased 
military production stemming from World War II, the impact of work relief operations in 
upstate New York remain mixed.   
As they operated in upstate New York, work programs were highly successful in 
the facilitation of diverse projects and programs flexible enough to provide appropriate 
employment opportunities and socially useful projects to the varied agricultural and 
industrial communities of the upstate district.  On the other hand, each of the TERA, 
FERA and WPA proved unable to completely address the volume of relief needed across 
the region, with many of the area’s largest cities in 1940 financially unable to supply 
federally required financial contributions in order to continue participation in the WPA.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Historiography 
On October 10th, 1929, members of the Schenectady Rotary Club gathered for 
their weekly luncheon meeting and lecture at the Hotel Van Curler on Washington Street 
in Schenectady.  That particular Thursday, those in attendance enjoyed a lecture from 
Union College Professor George D. Kellogg entitled “Prosperity, Speculation and the 
Federal Reserve System” that aimed to discuss and explain the wave of prosperity that 
had crashed over the United States during the preceding decade.1  Outside of 
Schenectady, during the late 1920’s interest in the nation’s good fortune captivated 
citizens across the country. Following eight years of the Republican “New Era,” a period 
of policy oriented explicitly towards aiding business and increasing economic efficiency, 
the nation appeared to be on the brink of unprecedented and enduring stability and 
prosperity.  By 1929 the national unemployment rate measured a paltry 3.2%, wages and 
prices were holding constant, industrial output surged, and profits remained high and 
stable throughout the majority of the 1920’s.2  By all means, to many Americans 
President Herbert Hoover’s promise of “triumph over poverty” articulated in his 
acceptance speech for the Republican Party nomination for the presidency in 1928 
seemed to be without a doubt imminent.3 
However, with the arrival of October 29th, 1929, “Black Tuesday,” and the 
diminishment of 90% of the New York Stock Exchange’s value, any and all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Professor Kellogg to Address Rotary Club,” The Schenectady Gazette, October 10, 1929. Pg. 15.  
2 Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-40, 29; Nick Taylor, American-Made: The Enduring 
Legacy of The WPA: When FDR Put The Nation To Work. (New York: Bantam Book, 2008), 9. 
3 Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-40 (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 1989), 29. 
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proclamations of sustained affluence for the American people came crashing down.4  
Beginning in earnest with that fateful October day, by 1930 the Great Depression had 
brought about the collapse of over 50,000 businesses.5  By 1932 over 3,600 banks had 
closed their doors as industrial output plummeted from $949 million to $74 million.6  At 
its worst the Great Depression reduced as many as 15 million men and women, 24.9% of 
the U.S. population in 1933, to a state of hopeless unemployment.7  Even those 
individuals fortunate enough to retain employment during the period more often than not 
found themselves providing for their families on drastically reduced hours and 
substantially cut wages.  A grim reminder of the times, the 1930 suicide note of an out of 
work mechanic from Houston, Texas offers insight into the bleak situation faced by many 
Americans during the Great Depression.  
There is no work to be had.  I can’t accept charity and I am too proud to appeal to 
my kin or friends, and I am too honest to steal.  So I see no other course.  A land 
flowing with milk and honey and a first class mechanic can’t make an honest 
living.  I would rather take my chances with a just god than with unjust 
humanity.8 
 
As prevailing societal attitudes regarded charity and public aid as the shameful last 
resorts of failed persons, many individuals felt they were left with few other options. 
 Following the election of Democrat Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932, 
nationally evolving attitudes on relief combined with negative reactions to the scale of 
despair seen among unemployed populations to catalyze the creation of a new option for 
out-of-luck workers.  Following the examples of progressive states like New York, New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Taylor, American-Made, 7.  
5 Taylor, American-Made, 9. 
6 Taylor, American-Made, 9; William Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1931-1935. 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963),1. 
7 Taylor, American-Made,1,542. 
8 Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-40, 11. 
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Jersey, and Pennsylvania who expanded the role of state governments in relief over the 
course of 1931 and 1932, with the establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps and 
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration in 1933 the federal government entered the 
business of relief in a striking and unprecedented way.9  Over the course of the next two 
years, President Roosevelt and his team of New Dealers funneled billions of dollars into 
state and federal “work programs” like the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration 
in New York and the Civil Works Administration (CWA) nationally, meant to stymie the 
worst effects of the depression while simultaneously creating useful and worthwhile 
public works.10  Following the employment of 4,264,000 individuals under the highly 
successful and popular CWA during the winter of 1933-1934, with the approval of the 
Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 1935, the Works Progress Administration 
(WPA), the largest and longest running work program of the New Deal, came into 
existence.11   
Active between 1935 and 1943, the WPA employed millions of previously 
unemployed workers, providing money and self-respect not afforded by direct relief or 
charity.  By the time of its demise in 1943, the WPA had employed over 8,500,000 
Americans over the course of its operation.12  In its first five years alone, the WPA 
completed 250,000 projects.  According to Nick Taylor, author of a recent chronicle of 
the WPA, American Made, by the time of its termination the WPA had played a part in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Josephine Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939 (New York: Henry Holt And Company, 1940), 94-98 
10 The PWA, as a public works program, must be distinguished from the CWA and WPA.  While its 
projects employed a significant number of workers on welfare rolls, status as a relief recipient was by no 
means a requirement of PWA employment.  Unlike the WPA and CWA, the employment with the PWA 
was not work relief but public employment, often mediated by private contractors. Nick Taylor. American-
Made, 114. 
11 Nick Taylor. American-Made: The Enduring Legacy of The WPA: When FDR Put The Nation To Work. 
(New York: Bantam Book, 2008), 543. 
12 Taylor, American-Made, 3. 
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the construction of “650,000 miles of roads, 78,000 bridges, 125,000 civilian and military 
buildings, 800 airports… and 700 miles of airport runways.”13  These physical works, 
alongside school lunch programs, nursery school operations, commissioned artwork, 
concerts, plays, and a host of other ventures in the performing arts provided out-of-work 
Americans a viable option for relief that did not involve relatives, “the dole,” or the 
dreaded feeling of hopelessness and shame associated with direct relief.  In essence, the 
WPA represented a form of relief without the stigma of relief.14   
Unfortunately, while the existing research on work relief is vast, the amount of 
scholarship dedicated to its influence in non-urban regions is highly limited.  That which 
is dedicated to regions like upstate New York, often overshadowed by their larger urban 
neighbors like New York City, is next to negligible.  It is this dilemma that is addressed 
in the body of the study at hand.  This thesis examines the distinct role and character of 
work relief in upstate New York between the years of 1931 and 1943.  Here it is argued 
that work relief in upstate New York during the Great Depression operated through a 
continuum of programs, spanning from the establishment of the New York State TERA 
in late September of 1931 to the discontinuation of the WPA in June of 1943. In the 
upstate region, between late 1935 and 1938 the WPA built on legacies established by the 
TERA, FERA, and CWA in order to orchestrate a substantial shift of unemployed 
individuals from local relief rolls to federally funded, locally sponsored work projects 
tailored to the specific needs of the region’s municipalities and unemployed populations.   
However, the ultimate success of the Administration in the upstate area was sacrificed by 
federal budgetary cuts and regulations over the course of 1938 and 1939 which, resulting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., 523. 
14 Ibid., 523. 
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in the reversal of positive trends established in 1936, sparked discontent among relief 
populations in the state’s large industrial communities.  Despite a renaissance in the 
WPA’s activities in the early 1940’s, the result of increased military production 
stemming from World War II, the impact of work relief operations in upstate New York 
remain mixed.  As they operated in upstate New York, work programs were highly 
successful in the facilitation of diverse projects and programs flexible enough to provide 
appropriate employment opportunities and socially useful projects to the varied 
agricultural and industrial communities of the upstate district.  On the other hand, each of 
the TERA, FERA, CWA and WPA proved unable to completely address the volume of 
relief needed across the region, with many of the area’s largest cities in 1940 financially 
unable to supply federally required financial contributions in order to continue 
participation in the WPA.   
The Temporary Emergency Relief Administration of New York, perhaps the 
smallest of the pre-WPA relief set-ups examined, has received the least amount of 
scholarly attention since its termination.  That said, from the earliest analyses of the 
program in the early 1940’s through those presented in the first decade of the 21st 
century, general sentiment regarding the TERA has seen little change.  The vast majority 
of work on the TERA has come in the context of broader publications on other subjects.  
Josephine Brown’s 1940 work Public Relief 1929-1939 provides the earliest account of 
the administration, and examines it within the framework of wider relief developments 
through the 1930’s.  Brown very briefly inspects the work of the TERA, unpacking the 
policies of the organization and detailing their impact on later programs.15 Brown argues 
that the program’s “authority to reimburse and the power to enforce rules” gave it “a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Josephine C. Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1940) 90-94. 
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powerful lever for the improvement of relief, methods of administration and personnel.”  
However, more than anything, she else emphasizes the program’s importance for the 
development of other state relief agencies and federal work relief endeavors, and 
accentuates that the TERA’s role in establishing “an important precedent” for state to 
local relationships in the administration of relief.16  Nick Taylor’s 2008 anthology of the 
WPA, American-Made, characterizes the influence of the TERA in a way similar to 
Brown, contending that experiences of the TERA “formed components of the relief plan” 
which Harry Hopkins took with him to Washington in 1933.17  Offering a different 
perspective, in 2001’s history of the State of New York, The Empire State, editor Milton 
M. Klien emphasizes the TERA’s impact on state-level politics, particularly what he 
describes as its hand in dividing the state’s liberal and conservative political wings.18   
Published in 1947, Alexander Leopold Radomski’s Work Relief in New York 
State, 1931-1935 offers what has become the definitive academic account of the TERA. 
Providing a meticulously detailed report on the historical and administrative structure 
context of the TERA, like Brown and Taylor, Work Relief articulates the national 
significance of the TERA by emphasizing the state and federal imitations of the New 
York relief structure that followed its creation.  However, in addition to arguing that the 
principles established in the TERA “formed the core proximate background out of where 
succeeding ‘permanent’ measures would come,” Radomski goes further than Brown or 
Taylor and singles out the TERA as singly “outstanding” among pre-federal relief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid. 116, 140. 
17 Taylor, American-Made, 98-99. 
18 Milton M. Klein, The Empire State: A History of New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 578-
580. 
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operations.19 Despite its optimism, Work Relief is not blind to the TERA’s shortcomings, 
and warns architects of future work relief programs to learn from the “so-called 
disadvantages of work relief.” However, Radmonski’s tone when discussing drawbacks 
such as increased cost over direct relief and competition with regular private enterprises, 
is fairly dismissive, a tell as to the author’s affinity for and belief in the success and 
power of the TERA.20 
Benefiting from national prominence and the Great Depression’s near-mythic 
status as the economic low point of 20th century America, the field of scholarship 
dedicated to chronicling and analyzing federal work relief programs active during the 
1930’s and 1940’s, specifically the WPA, has grown immense.  81 years have passed 
since the advent of the first federal relief programs, and as a result, the analysis of the 
subject has evolved into a diverse and ever-changing field with a rich history of divergent 
and concurrent opinions sourced from political disciplines on either ends of the American 
spectrum.   
For those federal relief programs that followed the TERA, genesis for scholarly 
analysis came with FERA/CWA/WPA director Harry Hopkins’ 1936 account of his 
involvement in Depression-era work relief entitled Spending To Save.  Examining each of 
the FERA, CWA and WPA, Hopkins’ work offered what is perhaps one of the earliest 
detailed accounts of New Deal work relief and the attitudes and opinions beholden to 
those closest to its operation.  Over the course of Spending To Save, Hopkins approaches 
each program addressed with an overwhelmingly positive attitude. With regard to the 
FERA, despite admitting that the program was never able to provide adequate relief to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Alexander Leopold Radomski, Work Relief in New York State, 1931-1935 (Morningside Heights, New 
York: King’s Crown Press, 1947), X, 1, 29, 79, 103, 134, 183, 234, 273, 315. 
20 Radomski, Work Relief in New York State, 1931-1935, 325.  
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those who needed it, he nevertheless hailed the organization’s scope and applauded its 
physical accomplishments.21  Similarly, Hopkins lauded the CWA for its success in 
supplying federal employment to unemployed populations neglected by private industry 
and for its role as a probationary or preliminary version of the WPA.22   
Devoting only one chapter to the program itself, Spending To Save presents the 
WPA as a program oriented around the swift and direct employment of out-of-work 
parties rather than toward the completion of large-scale, grandiose projects designed to 
increase industrial production and indirect job growth as the PWA attempted. Describing 
the WPA as product of fervor for work relief which followed in the wake of the 
enormously popular Civil Works Administration in the winter and early spring of 
1933/1934, Hopkins states that “the WPA was to be the flexible unit acting to equalize 
employment on larger projects,” employing 3,500,000 persons, 90% of which were to 
come directly from relief rolls.23  At its core, Spending To Save set the template for the 
standard overview of the WPA and its tenets, outlining basic standards of project 
creation, employment, wage scales, and ideology.24    
Not surprisingly, examined closely the work appears to be largely an exercise in 
self-congratulation and self-defense.  Hopkins neglects to acknowledge most areas of 
contemporary and future controversy surrounding particular policies practiced by the 
New Deal.  Instead, race, gender and age, the legitimacy of arts programs, and 
disagreements regarding WPA pay scales are all framed in positive angles for the WPA, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid., 99, 164-165. 
22 Harry L. Hopkins, Spending To Save: The Complete Story of Relief (New York: W.W. Norton, 1936). 
125. 
23 Hopkins, Spending To Save, 166/167.  
24 Ibid., 162, 163, 167-169 
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with focus given only on the positive aspects of each.25  In Spending To Save, Hopkins 
established the standard from which future analyses of the WPA have deviated. What’s 
more, Hopkins sought to distinguish the WPA from traditional work relief.  It was his 
belief that by offering standardized wages akin to those found in private industry rather 
than relief via earmarked subsidies for the purchase of particular groceries and 
commodities, the stigma of helplessness and dependence created by conventional forms 
of welfare could be broken.26 Hopkins positive take on the administration represented the 
opinions of those who created the program, an assessment akin to a mother’s critique of 
her child; quick to celebrate positive attributes and slow to recognize deficiencies. 
Spending to Save was published in in 1936, only a year after the program’s inception and 
far too early to provide commentary on the program’s future developmental issues.  
While a later publish date may have tempered this noticeable lack of critical analysis to 
an extent, as it stands the work nevertheless provides the earliest and most optimistic 
view of the WPA published. 
Examinations of the CWA and FERA published after Spending To Save have 
tended to offer assessments of the program much different from Hopkins’.  Two works, 
Forrest A. Walker’s The Civil Works Administration: An Experiment in Federal Work 
Relief, 1933-1934 (1977) and Bonnie Fox Schwartz’s The Civil Works Administration, 
1933-1934 (1983), serve as the primary authorities on regarding the CWA. Both Walker 
and Schwartz approach the CWA with measured enthusiasm that do not reach the levels 
articulated by Hopkins. Each work asserts that the program was neither a brilliant blast of 
progressive liberalism as modern liberals have imagined, nor was it rooted in tradition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ibid., 161-163, 167, 169-171, 175-177.	  
26 Ibid., 114. 
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and conservatism to the level argued by revisionist histories.27  Instead, both Walker and 
Schwartz characterize the CWA as a mild success; a program whose centralized structure 
was of undeniable importance for the development of future programs like the WPA, but 
which if allowed to continue would not have had any noticeable positive effect on the 
overall economic recovery of the nation.28  
Similarly, since the late 1930’s the FERA has been discussed with relative 
brevity. No master works have been written on the FERA, and what has recorded often 
appears in the context of more general discussions regarding relief, the New Deal, and the 
Roosevelt Administration. In 1940’s Public Relief, Brown reserves both praise and 
criticism for the program.  Brown describes the early FERA as a fine project but 
inadequate for the sufficient provision of relief.  She admires the late era of the FERA for 
its shift in focus from small projects to large construction endeavors, but strongly 
criticizes the program for its return to a budgetary deficiency wage scale, whereby 
monetary compensation was allotted according to assessed need determined by a social 
worker’s investigation.29  Brown further faults the program for its lack of initiatives in 
rural areas and for having an administrative structure that allowed some towns to not 
create projects where they were needed.30  The works of Radomski, Walker, and 
Schwartz as well as Jason Scott Smith’s Building New Deal Liberalism address the 
FERA in the process of explaining the works of the programs and theses at the center of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Bonnie Fox Schwartz, The Civil Works Administration, 1933-1934 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983) ix. 
28 Forrest A. Walker, The Civil Works Administration: An Experiment in Federal Work Relief (New York: 
Garland Publishing Inc., 1979), 164.  For specific arguments, see Schwartz, The Civil Works 
Administration, 1933-1934, ix, vii, 213-259, 274-276; Walker, The Civil Works Administration: An 
Experiment in Federal Work Relief, 20-25, 155-158, 159, 164. 
29 Brown, Public Relief, 1929-1939, 241-242. 
30 Ibid.  
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their respective publications.31  Of these accounts, only Schwartz actually assesses the 
program’s success, contending that, in its later stages the FERA was “no more than an 
un-acceptable makeshift” attempt at work relief.32  Walker and Smith merely speculate as 
to the program’s role in developing future federal relief programs, with Walker arguing 
that it did not and Smith arguing that it did.33 
Early histories of the Works Progress Administration, penned during the halcyon 
days of the organization, tended to paint the venture as an almost unconditional success.  
Shrugging off period criticisms from the Right and Left, initial assessments of the 
program by and large valued the endeavor's vision over its actual implementation.  These 
appraisals wholeheartedly endorsed the notion of a federally funded form of work relief 
which valued the “full employment of all peoples willing and able to work in occupations 
suited to their skills,” over the physical and economic accomplishments of the projects 
undertaken.34  Despite remaining generally positive in the tone, over time histories of the 
WPA have become increasingly specific and more openly critical of many aspects of the 
program itself.  This criticism reached a fever pitch in the early 1960’s, with New Left 
historians denouncing the program’s motives and questioning the legitimacy of its liberal 
pedigree. Since then assessments have become substantially more measured.  The past 40 
years have seen a slow shift among New Deal academics towards an understanding of the 
WPA as a multifaceted organization whose positives and negatives cannot be neatly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Walker, The Civil Works Administration: An Experiment in Federal Work Relief, 20-25; Schwartz, The 
Civil Works Administration, 1933-1934, 240; Jason Scott Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism: The 
Political Economy of Public Works, 102, 138. 
32 Schwartz, The Civil Works Administration, 1933-1934, 240. 33	  Walker, The Civil Works Administration: An Experiment in Federal Work Relief, 20-25; Jason Scott 
Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 102, 138. 
34 Arthur W Macmahon, John David Millett, and Gladys Ogden. The Administration of Federal Work 
Relief. Studies in Administration.  (Vol. 12. Chicago: Published for the Committee on Public 
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deciphered.  Most recent accounts recognize the program as an extraordinary balancing 
act of ideology, practicality, and personalities that created a complex web of both 
constructive and damaging policy with consequences significant for not only depression 
era America, but for the modern epoch as well.   
As the first years of the WPA came to pass and the public became divided in their 
support and derision of the administration, the first post-Hopkins scholarly analyses of 
the program produced compelling evaluations of the organization’s strengths and 
weaknesses.    However objective in nature, works published during the years of peak 
WPA activity to an extent maintained the positive tone exhibited by administration 
officials in their scrutiny of the program. Published in 1941 under the banner of the 
Public Administration Service, Arthur Macmahon, John Millett, and Gladys Ogden’s 
work The Administration of Federal Work Relief, an account of the program’s 
administrative processes, offered nothing but kind words for the WPA’s work.  Praising 
the organization’s prowess in avoiding “the wastage of human resources,” improving the 
national infrastructure, and pioneering new social services; Macmahon and company 
argued that “no matter what may be the future of the WPA, its reputation is secure.”35  
The authors continued to praise the WPA’s employment levels, physical 
accomplishments, cultural contributions, and the sheer size and collaborative nature of 
the program’s administrative system.36  Likewise, Donald S. Howard, author of The WPA 
and Federal Relief Policy published by the Russell Sage Foundation in 1943, treated the 
WPA with similar reverence to The Administration of Federal Work Relief, stating that 
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It is the conviction of the writer that federal policy providing work for the 
jobless—even such work as the WPA has had the power to give—has been of 
inestimable value to millions of workers who otherwise would have been idle, and 
in many instances, without means of subsistence.37  
 
Further, Howard offered little reprimand for the program’s discriminatory treatment of 
minority groups, specifically African Americans, women, and the aged— despite 
acknowledging the plight these groups faced.38   
 
However, in the face their overall laudatory tone, these works also provide the 
first real criticisms of the WPA from the published academic world.  For instance, though 
Josephine Brown’s Public Relief, 1929-1939 praised the WPA over the systems of 
private relief typical of the period prior to the 1930’s, by no means did she believe the 
WPA’s work to be adequate.  Brown praised the WPA’s security wage for its superiority 
over former provisions of relief, but simultaneously characterized the program as 
concerned more with “work aspects” rather than “relief aspects” of the program, 
sacrificing quality of relief for quantity and leaving the quality of relief as low as was 
consistent with the bare minimums of the program’s general employment goals.39  In 
short, Brown was supportive of the WPA’s general work, but did not believe the program 
went far enough.  Similarly, in the last chapter of Administration of Federal Work Relief, 
“Some Lessons of A Multiple Program,” Macmahon articulates a number of substantial 
criticisms for the New Deal’s flagship work program, suggesting that, first and foremost, 
the retraining of workers should have been pursued more vigorously so to satisfy 
occupational voids on job sites.  They also reproach the complexity and inefficiency in 
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the organization itself.  To Macmahon, for the WPA to be truly successful, the 
organization needed to streamline its processes of planning and better define the 
bureaucratic divisions within its operational structure, in the process creating a more 
straightforward role for the President in the program’s decision-making processes.40  
More extensive in his analysis of the work of the WPA itself, Howard presents a number 
of substantial complaints regarding the WPA.  Similarly to Brown, Howard argues that 
the kinds of jobs the WPA was able to offer the American public were neither of a scale 
nor caliber befitting the “richest nation in the world.”41  Further, Howard openly 
disagrees with Hopkins that employment by the WPA does not constitute work relief.  
Instead he contends that the WPA’s resemblance to work relief, as opposed to “real 
work,” served as one of the program’s biggest shortcomings, a critique that has 
continued, in one shape or another, into current analyses of New Deal work projects.42  
In fact, many of Howard’s critiques chastise the New Deal for not going further 
with its works program than it did. Howard criticized the the WPA’s use of a lower 
“security wage” over prevailing regional wages, condemned the program’s curtailment of 
workers’ organizing rights and political engagements, and blamed Congressional 
limitations on sub-par employment standards, conditions of employment, work type, and 
materials for stunting the potential success of the program.  Additionally, he demanded 
future work relief endeavors that would expand the work of the WPA, and would ensure 
the employment of all who “(a) are not already employed at wage rates and under 
conditions meeting socially approved standards and (b) can practically be given useful 
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employment in keeping with their skills and abilities.”43  More than just representing, 
alongside Macmahon and Brown, the first significant negative critiques of the WPA from 
academia, Howard’s work represents the first step taken towards more substantial 
criticism of the WPA in later years.  This trend culminated in the denunciation of the 
organization by New Left scholars in the 1960’s and by later conservative writers who 
have channeled the criticisms of their 1930’s conservatives.  The fact remains however 
that early academic works detailing the functions and successes of the WPA firmly 
supported the organization, and often turned a blind eye to some of the WPA’s most 
controversial policies. In all, the attitudes conveyed in the work of early WPA scholars 
are embodied in the final chapter of The Administration of Federal Work Relief when 
speaking of the failings of the Administration it is said “But how much greater would 
have been the lost opportunities if something like the works program had never been 
attempted!”44 
As previously stated, the small strides taken towards more critical analysis of the 
WPA in the 1940’s gave way in the mid 1960’s to progressively more censorious 
examinations of the program, its accomplishments and its policies.  However, this 
evolution did not occur on the turn of a dime.  Over the course of the late 1950’s and 
early 1960’s works published by the likes of Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and William 
Leuchtenburg developed more complex arguments regarding the success and 
functionality of the WPA than contended by those scholars whose syntheses of the 
program were developed contemporary to its operation.  The works of historians writing 	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in this period are characterized by still persistent praise of the organization and its attempt 
to solve the puzzle of Depression era unemployment.  However, this acclaim became 
tempered by more defined concerns relating to the program’s internal relations, 
operational decisions, and successes in achieving its stated goals.  
Viewed presently as perhaps one of the most influential histories of the New Deal 
to be produced in the postwar era, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s three-part work entitled The 
Age of Roosevelt is in its content largely evocative of the opinions of the New Dealers 
themselves where work programs are concerned, speaking favorably about the PWA and 
WPA and their symbiotic relationships with other New Deal pursuits.45 However, the real 
value of Schlesinger’s account is his a four-way clash of definition between Public 
Works Board members, particularly WPA head Harry Hopkins and former PWA director 
Harold Ickes, over spending priorities and direct versus indirect employment.46  Similar 
to earlier works, Schlesinger’s analysis does not pass explicit judgment on the potential 
limitations that bureaucratic quarrels may have imposed on the development of work 
programs like the WPA.  Rather than condemn the disputes, he appears to celebrate them 
as part of the grander story of the New Deal, and even examines the implications of the 
handling of the WPA for the political successes of Roosevelt.47  However, as recent 
analyses of Schesinger’s work have contended, The Age of Roosevelt offered in 1959 and 
1960 the first detailed examinations of what has been referred to as “the backstage 
workings” of the New Deal.48  In this way Schlesinger laid the foundations for future, 
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more critical analyses of the interpersonal relationships between WPA policy makers like 
those found in Nick Taylor’s 2008 examination of the WPA, American-Made.  The Age 
of Roosevelt represents the last hurrah for the overly celebratory accounts of the WPA 
that typified the post-war period. 
Published a mere three years after the last volume of The Age of Roosevelt, 
William Leuchtenburg’s Franklin D. Roosevelt and The New Deal has since its release 
become the benchmark publication for relatively evenhanded, mid-century synthesis of 
the WPA as well as the entire Roosevelt Administration.49  Brought to press in 1963, 
Leuchtenburg’s work grants only a small proportion of its page length to the WPA, and 
like its predecessors, awards a substantial level of praise to the organization.  “By pre-
depression standards,” Leuchtenburg claims, “Roosevelt’s works program marked a bold 
departure” from the largely hands off, laissez faire approach to relief pursued the Hoover 
administration before it.50  What’s more, Leuchtenburg states that by any criterion, the 
program was “an impressive achievement.”51  However, alongside this praise is offered 
more measured and reasoned criticism of the program.  Like Howard, Leuchtenburg 
derides WPA jobs as little more than a “disguised dole,” far removed from the pay and 
conditions of legitimate employment.52 
Moreover, Leuchtenberg’s work added substantial new critiques to supplement 
those similar to criticisms voiced by earlier historians. The analysis expressed in Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and the New Deal was the first to articulate substantial concerns regarding 
the budgetary and economic consequences of WPA policies.  According to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 As articulated later, despite offering a more balanced analysis of the WPA than offered by his 
predecessors, Leuchtenburg remains firmly sympathetic to the basic tenets of the organization itself. 
50 Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1931-1935.130 
51Ibid. 130  
52 Ibid. 
	   21	  
Leuchtenberg’s analysis, Roosevelt’s budget was too thinly spread to adequately support 
public employment of the scale necessary in order for the WPA operate effectively.  As a 
result of this course of action, the organization failed to employ a substantial proportion 
of the unemployed population, returning “some 10 million” of society’s least fortunate 
members to ill-equipped state relief organizations for relief.53 Leuchtenburg further 
criticizes the WPA for the program’s decision to emphasize immediate employment 
rather than worthwhile projects, declaring the selection of former head of the CWA Harry 
Hopkins over PWA director Harold Ickes as program director “regrettable.”54 According 
to Leuchtenburg’s evaluation, in emphasizing spending on employment rather than 
project costs, the administration restricted the potential size and scale of projects and 
created “make work” that offered no substantial benefit to persons other than WPA 
employees.55 Further, he argues that Roosevelt sacrificed a prevailing wage for WPA 
workers in order to court the favor of private business and contractors whose favor he had 
fallen out of since the establishment of the NRA.56  In spite of these criticisms, 
Leuchtenberg maintained a measured support of the program, praising construction 
works, educational initiatives, the Federal Writers Project, the Federal Arts Project, and 
vocational training under the National Youth Administration.57  Leuchtenberg applauded 
the WPA’s policy on race, stating that the removal of racial quotas allowed for increased 
allotment of employment and funds to blacks, unlike programs such as the Civilian 
Conservation Corps.58  Franklin Roosevelt and The New Deal represents a turning point 
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in the academic tradition surrounding the WPA.  Now far enough away from the program 
to enable retrospective analysis unaffected by nostalgic bias, real, substantive critiques of 
the WPA and of the New Deal in general could begin.  
By the late 1960’s the pragmatic analysis of the WPA present in the decade’s 
early years gave way to drastically less sympathetic critiques from writers of the era’s so-
called New-Left, an emerging leftist movement in the United States influenced by 
budding radicalism in the anti-war and Civil Rights movements, which rejected the 
establishmentarian liberalism as well as old-line radicalism.  Fresh thinking academics 
like Howard Zinn, Ronald Radosh, and Barton Bernstein penned works highly critical of 
a perceived veiled conservatism at work in the underpinnings of the WPA and the New 
Deal as a whole.59  In an essay entitled “The New Deal:  The Conservative Achievements 
of Liberal Reform,” from a collection entitled Towards A New Past, Barton Bernstein 
provided the perfect representation of New Left critiques of the WPA.  Though 
predominantly concerned with the NRA, Social Security, and the New Deal’s progressive 
income tax, all of which Bernstein regarded as “conservative approaches” to recovery, 
the text characterized the WPA as too slow, too cautious, and too conservative for 
success.60  To Bernstein the WPA failed largely as a result of President Roosevelt’s 
conservative inhibitions regarding deficit spending, a criticism reminiscent of 
Leuchtenburg.61  Though in 1937 the government injected enough funds into the national 
economy to spike industrial production to 90% of the operating capacity the year before 
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the depression, seven million Americans remained without employment.62  Rather than 
engage in an honest and full attempt at a federal work program, by Bernstein’s estimation 
Roosevelt handicapped the administration by cutting expenditures and attempting to 
balance the budget in 1937, withdrawing funds from a program that had already suffered 
from funding imposed limitations.63  Beyond criticism of New Deal conservatism, 
Bernstein brought to the table a more direct reproach and skepticism of the WPA’s 
relationship with minorities than previously pronounced in past eras of scholarship.  
Despite concurring with previous assessments of the race relations in the WPA which 
depicted the organization as relatively friendly to African Americans, at least when 
compared to other New Deal programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps, Bernstein 
breaks with his predecessors over the issue of why blacks were treated relatively well in 
the in the WPA. Bernstein asserts that blacks received WPA jobs, and at some locations 
equal pay, as a consequence of their position among the working poor rather than for 
their status as black Americans.  While the black community, outside of a few 
intellectuals, did not feel the distinction significant, Bernstein believed the discrepancy to 
have substantial implications for the overall state of race relations in New Deal and post-
war America, arguing that the WPA did not provide aid to Blacks based on the equality 
of their race, but on the severity of their poverty, making the issue a matter of practicality 
rather than equality that might apply to all aspects of life.64  In their respective works 
New Deal Thought, “The Myth of The New Deal,” and Poor People’s Movements, 
Howard Zinn, Ronald Radosh and Frances Fox Piven argue similar critiques to those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid., 277. 
63 Ibid., 278. 
64 Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and The New Deal, 187; Bernstein, “The New Deal: The 
Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform,” in Towards A New Past: Dissenting Essays in American 
History, 279. 
	   24	  
maintained by Bernstein, establishing a far-left academic appraisal of the Works Progress 
Administration focused largely on the fiscal and racial limitations of the organization 
which, according to Leuchtenburg, was no more radical than the objections of non-
academic, old-time Marxists to the New Deal during its heyday.65  
Evolving from the harsh critiques which characterized New Left scholarship, the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen more restrained, moderate 
assessments of the program and its effects.  Accepting the institution’s inadequacies 
while simultaneously embracing its achievements, by the late 20th century historians of 
the WPA came to disregard the assessments of the New Left as excessive and inaccurate.  
Writing in 1989, in his book The New Deal: The Depression Years Anthony Badger 
articulated a centrist take on the WPA which has typified the moderate character of most 
modern investigations of the administration. According to Badger, it is undeniable that 
surveys undertaken during the early 1930’s witnessed “a growing unrest amongst the 
unemployed” and increased communist behavior.  However, in direct response to 
arguments articulated in Piven’s Poor People’s Movements, Badger characterized 
assertions that depression-era work relief represented conservative shift designed to 
“restore stability” among the American people as entirely inaccurate.66  Rather, Badger 
framed work relief as “progressive expansion” of the American government’s 
commitment to the welfare of its people that established a developmental trajectory for 
federal aid to the poor.67  The precedent set by the WPA, Badger argued, directly 
influenced the enlargement of the welfare state under Johnson’s great society and other 	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similar policy initiatives.68 This same sentiment can also be found in Building New Deal 
Liberalism and American Made, both of which resemble The New Deal in their wide lens 
examinations of the WPA.   
 Over the past fifteen years, arguments articulated in examinations of the WPA 
have become increasingly more varied with respect to characterization of the program in 
a positive or negative light.  Broader works targeting subjects like the developmental path 
of the WPA, the ideology of the New Deal and the effect of the WPA’s emphasis on 
public works have, in general, tended to frame the administration in a relatively favorable 
light.  Smith, for example, states in Building A New Deal Liberalism that the WPA was 
an “extraordinarily successful method of state-sponsored economic development.”69 In 
much the same way, in Long Range Public Investment (2007) Robert D. Leighninger 
asserts that the program’s investment in public institutions like hospitals and public 
centers of recreation that still stand today provided long term benefits for the U.S. people, 
a “legacy (that) stands solidly and quietly all around.”70 Even in works that question the 
program’s handling of race, gender, wages, funding and politics the organization has 
been depicted positively.  For example, in Taylor’s American-Made, the main argument 
articulated is that the WPA guided the United States to recognize its citizens more as a 
resource and less as a commodity, forcing it to recognize the need to cultivate that 
resource and provide for it lest it disappear.71  Meanwhile, specific examinations of the 
program’s track record on controversial issues like race privilege and workers’ rights 
have become increasingly more critical. Both Ira Katznelson’s When Affirmative Action 	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Was White (2005) and Chad Alan Goldberg’s Citizens and Paupers (2007) have come 
down hard on the WPA for what they have characterized as blatant disregard for and 
mishandling of the systems of discrimination in place against non-white workers in the 
South and relief recipients nationwide.72 
The works detailed above contain mostly sympathetic views towards New Deal 
policy.  Overall, published scholarly criticism of the WPA from conservative academics 
is rare, and overwhelmingly those publications that have criticized the program have 
offered only liberal critiques of perceived negative aspects of WPA procedures.   That is 
not to say, however, that the conservative wing of the historical discipline has not 
provided its own scrutiny of Works Progress Administration practices and procedures.  
Fiscal conservatism has a long-standing objection to the New Deal in general, harboring 
particular disdain for the WPA.  Even before the genesis of the WPA, conservative critics 
both in Congress and in media outlets like the Chicago Tribune and the New York Sun 
treated federally funded work relief with open hostility. Trumpeting concerns regarding 
the capacity for work relief projects to incur waste and graft, opponents of the method 
attempted to discredit its legitimacy in the public eye, nationally condemning the FERA 
projects as wasteful “boondoggles” undeserving of federal funds.  Conservative attacks 
reached a fever pitch in 1938 when congressional conservatives on the now infamous 
Dies Committee attacked the Federal Writers Program as a hotbed for communist 
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activity, interrogating employees and administrators regarding their work for the project 
and capturing the attention of the nation.73 
The essential conservative critique articulated during the 1930’s has endured far 
beyond the decade and circumstances of their origins.  Edgar Eugene Robinson’s 1951 
publication The Roosevelt Leadership 1933-1935 carried forward the criticisms voiced by 
the American Right into the second half of the 20th century.  Despite dedicating only 
limited space to the WPA itself, Robinson depicted the WPA as little more than the 
frivolous expenditure of millions of dollars to cover the failures of the Public Works 
Admiration and to secure votes in an election year.74  Like Robinson, in his 2002 work 
Rethinking The Great Depression, Professor Emeritus at Marquette University Gene 
Smiley disparaged the WPA as a step which President Roosevelt took to “further improve 
his reelection chances.”75  Beyond characterization as a mere political maneuver 
however, Smiley expanded his critique to include retrospective analysis of the WPA’s 
effectiveness in curbing unemployment.  Smiley asserts that rather than helping to 
quickly reduce unemployment roles to pre-depression levels, the WPA in actuality 
slowed the decline of unemployment during the late 1930’s and early 1940’s as a result 
of the growing preference among unemployed workers for the steady and predictable 
work of the WPA when faced with the turbulent private sector as an alternative.76   
Most recently, Amity Shlaes’ New York Times business bestseller The Forgotten 
Man: A New History of the Great Depression has provided perhaps the best example of 
the modern conservative evaluation of the WPA, and more broadly, the greater New 	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Deal.  In The Forgotten Man, Shlaes paints the portrait of a WPA predisposed to make-
work and inefficiency, used for political gain, thirsty for spending, overly sympathetic to 
minorities, and a heavy burden to the taxpayer.77  Shlaes’ account of the New Deal, and 
specifically the WPA, clearly echoes the conservative critiques of the program voiced by 
its opponents in the 1930’s.  Essentially, The Forgotten Man presents the argument that 
in establishing and continuing to funnel money into the WPA, the Roosevelt 
administration was fast and loose with the taxpayer’s money, and was thus “joyriding to 
bankruptcy” on their dime.78  While the version of New Deal events presented by Shlaes 
fundamentally conflicts with the overwhelming majority of WPA histories and analyses, 
particularly with New Left inquiries in the 1960’s, it represents an important undercurrent 
in WPA scholarship and cannot be ignored. 
Unfortunately, while the litany of materials documenting the WPA in its more 
general capacities is immense, the collection of those resources detailing the WPA’s role 
in upstate New York is miniscule.  While brief mentions of the rural northern region of 
New York State can be found in select WPA histories, for instance in Howard’s The WPA 
and Federal Relief and Macmahon’s The Administration of Federal Work Relief, 
references are predominantly fleeting, used only to accentuate broader points concerning 
discrimination against relief workers in private industries, asymmetry in the awarding of 
WPA funds, and patterns of residency for skilled versus unskilled workers.79  Details of 
the administration’s upstate involvement are found most often in histories of the state 
itself that contain sections relating to the Great Depression.  The most extensive account 	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of the WPA in upstate New York is offered by Milton M. Klein in his The Empire State, 
a historical account of New York State, beginning prior to Dutch invasion and concluding 
with the year 2000.  The Empire State chronicles the plight of upstate cities, and to some 
extent smaller towns, from the onset of the depression through the start of World War 
Two.  Though focusing principally on Syracuse, Rochester, Troy, Utica and Buffalo 
when describing the early days of the depression, a small amount of attention is given to 
rural agricultural regions in central New York..80  Here Klein describes agriculture to 
have been “long in a slump,” but with the advent of the Depression, facing “utter 
disaster.”81 Klein not only depicts the early days of the depression, but also notes the rise 
of state-level attempts at work relief like the Temporary Emergency Relief 
Administration (TERA) as well as the role these organizations played in the state 
following their creation.82  With regard to the WPA itself, the organization’s presence in 
upstate New York was strong.   As the administration went to work in Albany, Buffalo, 
Utica, Kingston, Syracuse, Rochester, Westchester and countless other upstate 
communities to build high schools, sewer systems, roads, bridges and parks, its 
popularity was proven by the electoral failure of so-called “upstate reactionaries” in 
solidly Republican counties in central New York who spat objections to the “monstrosity, 
commonly called the New Deal.”83  In combination with New York: A Guide To The 
Empire State, a product of the WPA Federal Writers Project, which provides a laundry 
list of specific WPA projects in upstate New York ranging from the revival of old 	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handicrafts on Native American reservations to the renovation of the College of St. Rose 
in Albany, the Buffalo Zoological Gardens, and night schools for disabled children, The 
Empire State imparts evidence of an extensive WPA presence in upstate New York, and 
also lends useful information regarding the material state of the region during the time of 
the program’s operation.84 
The existing literary sources that pertain to the role of work relief in the rural and 
industrial communities of upstate New York are, at best, scarce. While the historiography 
of works regarding the WPA has grown exponentially over the past 80 years, 
encompassing an ever-expanding range of opinions and perspectives regarding the 
success, practicality, and ethics of the program, the fact remains that at best these 
analyses can provide lenses through which to examine the experience of the WPA in 
upstate New York.  This study extends from the measured critiques of Depression era 
work relief that have typified the post new-left period of scholarship.  Neither taking a 
purely positive or wholly negative stance on the matter, the argument presented here 
recognizes the undeniable successes of relief programs on both the state and federal level 
active between 1931 and 1943 and does not ignore the striking failures that accompany 
them.   However, the specific position taken in this document most directly compliments 
that of Josephine Brown in Public Relief 1929-1939.  Ms. Brown argues the integral 
position of the early New York relief structure in influencing and guiding the 
development of federal work relief in 1933, a contention that cannot be repudiated and 
which this paper makes clear. However, where Ms. Brown disparages governmental 	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focus on the “work aspects rather than on the relief aspects of their programs,” 
emphasizing “the employment opportunities offered, the assignment of workers on the 
basis of qualifications for the jobs to be done, and the operation of socially useful 
projects.”85  In contrast, this thesis presents the government’s heavy attention to such 
aspects as a key aspect of the program’s successes in the upstate region, ensuring that the 
diverse municipalities and occupational populations of the area were able to engage in the 
projects that best provided employment for the distinct relief populations in their varied 
communities and enabling the pursuit of projects which have provided lasting social and 
infrastructural benefits through the present day.  This is an aspect of relief which Brown 
shrugs off, but which this report finds important, especially for the purposes of judging 
the overall success of the WPA, as program goals articulated by National Director Harry 
Hopkins at the outset of the Administration’s work focused strictly on volume of 
employment and project creation rather than on perceived adequacy of relief on those 
jobs.86  As stated by Hopkins in Spending To Save,  
“In the relief business where our raw material is misery and our finished product 
nothing more than amelioration, effectiveness has to be measured in less 
ambitious terms than success.  That work applies better to marginal profit, cash or 
otherwise.  Relief deals with human insolvency.”87 
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Chapter 2:  Work Relief In Upstate New York Prior to The WPA 
 
On June 16th, 1935, newly appointed director of the Works Progress 
Administration, Harry Hopkins, arrived at Washington D.C.’s Mayflower Hotel.  At 
some minutes after 10:00am, a late-to-arrive Hopkins entered the hotel’s Pan-American 
Room to brief an assembled conference of state relief administrators on the proposed 
scope, responsibility and administrative structure of the yet-to-be-realized WPA.  Taking 
the podium following a short introduction from Assistant Administrator Colonel 
Lawrence Westbrook, Hopkins relayed to those in attendance the key features of the 
program.  At its most basic level, the administration’s objective would be “to take 
3,500,000 men and women who are now (were then) on relief throughout the nation and 
put them to work at useful public work.”1  Regardless of estimates concerning the WPA’s 
potential effect on indirect employment, and even more important than the “secondary 
objective” of creating the best projects possible—the main concern of the WPA would be 
the movement men and women otherwise incapable of obtaining jobs in private industry 
off of relief rolls and into direct employment on federal work projects.2  For an hour 
Hopkins provided administrators a concise overview of the WPA’s more specific goals, 
administrative structure, system of finance, potential pitfalls and possible propensity for 
criticism — briefly introducing each topic and incessantly reminding those in attendance 
of the WPA’s basic task.3   
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In concluding his remarks to the administrators, Hopkins took a moment to 
address the immense importance of the venture at hand.  The director argued that the 
WPA represented for many administrators the single greatest chance to help the 
American people that would ever again occur during their lifetimes.4 However, profound 
though Hopkins declaration may have been, his remark downplayed the substantial role 
work relief was already playing in many states across the country.  For both Harry 
Hopkins and the State of New York, the administration of work relief began in earnest in 
the year 1931 with the incorporation of TERA, the Temporary Emergency Relief 
Administration of New York.  From 1931 until the federal takeover of work relief by the 
WPA in 1935, New York operated a complex and innovative system of relief that laid the 
groundwork for future federal endeavors.  Unfortunately by 1935 the eroding quality of 
unrelenting financial strain compromised the adequacy of the New York program and 
necessitated a centralized federal intervention in order to continue the sufficient delivery 
of relief to unemployed populations. 
To understand the development of work relief in New York prior to the WPA, it is 
imperative to first understand the economic climate in New York during the opening 
years of the 1930’s.  The formation of TERA, as well as the more general tradition of 
work relief in New York prior to the WPA, was linked to the state’s economic situation 
in 1930 and 1931.  In 1930, the total employable workforce of New York State numbered 
approximately 5,523,337.5  Of these workers, roughly 5,225,964, or 95.2% found 
employment in white collar and blue-collar industrial occupations, while the remaining 
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267,273 persons, 4.8% of the whole, toiled on jobs in the agricultural sector.6  Removing 
New York City from the equation, the upstate region of New York counted 
approximately 2,469,262 employable persons, with 10.8% employment in agriculture.7  
That same year, employment surveys conducted by the State Committee on Economic 
Security revealed a statewide joblessness rate of 12.4%; by 1931 the rate had almost 
doubled to 24%.8  By the inaugural month of TERA’s operations, industrial powerhouses 
including Syracuse and Buffalo recorded that fewer than 60% of blue-collar workers in 
some of their cites’ neighborhoods were employed in full-time positions.9 Even worse, in 
1931 the state achieved a mere 68.8% of the employment level it had reached in the 
period from 1925 to 1927.10  In the city of Rochester employment achieved a meager 
71.1% of its 1925 to 1927 level, while Utica, Buffalo and the Albany/Schenectady/Troy 
regions, registered 67.8%, 63.7%, and 60.9% respectively.11 By late 1931, the health of 
New York’s economy was clearly in a grim decline. 
 Across New York, cities and counties attempted to restrain rising unemployment 
with independent work relief efforts.  At the close of 1930 a study conducted of 59 
upstate New York cities found that only six had experimented with full-blown work relief 
during the year in question.12  However, by the end of the winter of 1930-1931, a 
subsequent report produced by the same group found at least 27 of the same 59 cities 
investigated in the previous survey had, over the winter, created work relief programs in 	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their communities—a 350% increase in matter of mere months.13  While these new 
endeavors were not the first examples of work relief to occur in the northeast—Special 
Commissions on work relief had been set up and funds were earmarked by Massachusetts 
in both the 1914-1915 and 1921-1922 depressions, and theories valuing work programs 
through almshouses and houses of industry in “the suppression of pauperism” existed 
since the mid 18th century –they were the first substantial moves towards work relief in 
the modern sense of the term that can be found in upstate New York.14  It is evident these 
initial city and town efforts, along with relief reform measures such as the Public Welfare 
Law of 1929 helped to lay the foundations for and push lawmakers towards the creation a 
state level work relief organization in New York.    
By mid-1931 the state had begun to take its first substantial steps towards the 
establishment of state-sponsored work relief.  On January 13th, 1931, the Joint Committee 
of New York State Department of Social Welfare and the New York State Charities Aid 
released their first report on the condition of relief structures in New York.15  The report’s 
findings offered evidence of rapidly rising relief costs in many upstate communities, but 
concluded that no significant barriers impeded local peoples and governments from 
shouldering the burden of added relief costs themselves.16  Despite not mentioning work 
relief explicitly, the committee did recommend initiating of additional public works 
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programs through the state.  The direct result of these works would, in theory, be the 
reduction of financial strain placed on city and county relief efforts by increased 
unemployment.  More significantly though, the committee’s suggestion signaled New 
York State’s progress towards an expanded role in the administration of public relief.17  
Seven months after the presentation of its first findings, the committee’s second report 
depicted a scene far more severe than initially reported.  In line with national trends, the 
committee found a large majority of upstate cities to be approaching a crisis in their 
ability to adequately fund relief measures.18  Out of 45 cities examined, almost all had 
expended “nearly as much or more for public home relief” in the first half of 1931 as had 
been used in the entirety of 1930.19  Frightening on its own, accelerated spending was 
accompanied by the virtual exhaustion of budgetary funds and inadequate contributions 
from private sources to compensate for the insufficiency of public monies.20   
In a substantial break from traditional theories marking relief as a responsibility of 
individual counties and townships (so-called “localized” sources), the Committee 
recommended that the most severely affected districts be given some form of state aid in 
order to counterbalance the draining effect of rapidly escalating relief responsibilities on 
local funds.21 From late summer through winter of 1931 New York State took great 
strides towards the establishment of state-aided work relief.  By the end of August the 
measure had gained the support of Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  In a special 
message to the New York State Legislature on August 28th, the Governor articulated 
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support for the bill and professed a need for the state to “make available at once a large 
sum of public money to provide work for its residents… where useful public work can be 
found.”22 The Governor urged the legislature to act quickly on the statute presented to 
them. On September 23rd the Emergency Relief Act (ERA), formerly known as the Wicks 
Act, was passed by both houses of the state legislature and signed into law by the 
Governor himself, and on November 1st, 1931, New York State’s first foray into the 
realm of state-sponsored work relief went into operation. 23  
 The TERA was the first state administration in the nation to provide financial 
support to its cities, counties and townships for the establishment of work relief 
programs.  The legislation benefitted from the uniquely progressive political climate 
created in New York under the Roosevelt Administration. The influence of Frances 
Perkins’ work on unemployment insurance, U.S. Senator Robert F. Wagner’s federal 
stabilization bill of 1931 and Gerard Swope of General Electric’s “plan for government 
cartels in manufacturing” all helped to propel New York to primacy with regard to the 
implementation of liberal reforms in many aspects of state labor policy.24  But even in 
New York, prior to passage of the ERA, the basic sentiment regarding the disbursement 
of relief held by government administrators emphasized the inherently local nature of 
relief responsibilities. The preamble of the ERA itself noted that “the duty of providing 
aid for those in need or unemployed because of lack of employment is primarily an 
obligation of the municipalities.”25 However, TERA acknowledged the “vitally 
necessary” character of state intervention and assistance in the aid process in the case of 	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economic “emergencies” which, in their extreme nature, were considered to be 
detrimental to public health and safety.  Increased relief loads meant that local relief 
funds, drawn from real estate and property taxes, imposed a drain on local consumption 
patterns.26  This cycle of need left communities wholly incapable of handling the growing 
relief problem on their own.27 Thus, the primary objective articulated in the preamble of 
the ERA was to shift a portion of relief costs resultant from exceptional unemployment 
from individual localities to the state government. As such, the preamble displayed that 
the rare and emergency character of the economic turmoil of the early 1930’s played a 
large part in the evolution of relief policies in New York. In turn, the innovative approach 
to relief responsibility set forth by the TERA laid the groundwork for further state and 
federal intervention into the relief process.  In the six-month period following the ERA’s 
passage, the New York legislation was loosely copied by New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Illinois and the state of Ohio.28   
The TERA was organized and operated in a manner relatively consistent with the 
basic precepts laid out in its articles of establishment. Within the TERA hierarchy, 
supreme “administrative authority” lay in a three-man panel referred to as the “State 
TERA Commission.”29  In addition to the secondary function of acting as the official 
liaison on relief matters between New York and the federal government, the panel’s 
primary role was to examine and certify claims for home and/or work relief expenditures 
sent to them by city and county bodies known as “Emergency Work Bureaus” (ERBs). 
These ERBs represented geographically divided “public welfare districts,” based on 	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political borders.30  These EWBs were boards consisting of three or more members 
selected by each city or county’s mayor or board of supervisors and were the 
representatives of the State TERA Commission in each community.31 Following a 1933 
“enabling enactment,” a select number of counties and communities were authorized 
replace their Emergency Work Bureaus with Emergency Relief Bureaus (ERB), 
equivalent organizations that not only supervised work relief in their districts, but home 
relief as well.32  Each EWB was tasked with providing, administering, organizing and 
planning work relief efforts for their respective districts.33 Like the State TERA 
Commission on the state level, these EWBs acted as local liaisons between city and 
county relief structures and federal relief programs.34  
The program had an almost immediate effect on New York’s unemployed 
population.  In the program’s first two months, projects for the Departments of Health, 
Education, and Conservation, as well as for those of Public Works, Agriculture and 
Markets and Mental Hygiene provided work for laborers of all occupational categories.35  
Through January 7th, 1932 projects supported by the TERA expended $686,590 dollars.36  
The bulk of projects conducted consisted of light and heavy construction work on state-
owned land and facilities.  Eleven of the state’s colleges benefited from $96,350 dollars 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid. 82, 87 
31 Ibid. 87 
32 Ibid., 82, Normally Home relief was the dominion of existing county and city public welfare 
commissioners.   
33 Ibid., 87 
34 It is important to note here the TERA’s higher expenditure on work relief as compared to its home relief 
operations.  At peak operation, outside of New York City and Long Island the administration expended 
only $32,027,619.76 on home relief compared to $44,519,236.52 on work relief.  New York State, Public 
Unemployment Relief in New York State—Fourth Year; September 1, 1935-August 31, 1935 (Albany: 
TERA, 1935), 36-37. 
35 The Temporary Emergency Relief Administration of New York, Report of Temporary Emergency Relief 
Administration: Pursuant to Sec. 21, Chap. 798, Laws of 1931: January 11, 1932 (Albany, TERA: 1932) 7-
10. 
36 Ibid. 7. 
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in improvements to campuses and classroom facilities ranging from the installation of 
new water mains to the painting and repairing of roofs on class buildings.37  Additional 
work for unskilled laborers was provided in the rehabilitation of state park lands and the 
restoration of state mental health facilities in upstate locations like Utica and Syracuse.38  
In the program’s first two months of operation, road grading proved the most popular 
project type for cities and counties across the state, with 235 proposals submitted.  
Following road grading, in order of descending popularity the construction of new roads, 
brush clearance, improvement to municipal and county water works and storm sewers, 
reforestation, and general repairs to public properties provided the most work for relief 
recipients.39  White-collar workers were given employment on projects ranging from 
public data collection to the completion of topographical surveys for cartographical 
purposes.40  Though less numerous than manual projects, work provided for 
professionally trained men and women was nevertheless provided.  According to its own 
estimations, by January of 1932 the work accomplished by the TERA had “measurably 
met the situation” in New York in a manner both practical and effective.41   
 Shortly after the first state relief bills passed through legislatures in the fall of 
1931, pressure for an expanded federal role in the distribution of public relief increased 
both inside and outside of Washington, DC.  As winter approached, public welfare 
officials and sympathetic congressmen intensified calls for Federal relief.  High-ranking 
social workers like William Hodson, the executive Director of the Welfare Council of 
New York City, urged President Herbert Hoover to “establish a productive partnership” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid. 8. 
38 Ibid. 9-10. 
39 Ibid. 14. 
40 Ibid. 10, 12, 14. 
41 Ibid. 16. 
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between the Federal government and local relief authorities.42 Calling forth the best 
attributes of the national and local partners, proponents of federal relief argued that a 
combined enterprise would boost the overall quantity of funds available for relief 
operations, and would thus prevent the paralysis of local relief efforts as a result of 
insufficient funding.43  By the end of December, two separate bills calling for the 
disbursement of federal funds to state and local relief agencies had been introduced in 
Congress.  Offered by Senator Costigan of Colorado and Senator La Follette of 
Wisconsin, the two pieces of legislation contained similar text and each proposed to offer 
at least $250,000,000 in relief monies.  These funds would be administered via the 
Children’s Bureau under a new “Federal Board for Unemployment Relief.”44  Both bills 
were referred to the Senate Committee on Manufactures where progress towards passage 
stalled, despite the consolidation of both measures under the heading of a single bill in 
January of 1932.45 
Over the next year, Congressional authorities debated the wisdom of federal 
involvement in local relief.  Opponents of federal relief spending argued that increased 
expenditures on welfare would wreak havoc on the credit of the U.S. government, further 
hinder the recovery of private business and increase unemployment.46 Some detractors 
even went so far as to question the constitutionality of federal intervention, arguing that 
the parameters of federalism placed the role of welfare squarely on the shoulders of state 
and local authorities.47  According to this logic, opponents of federal relief spending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Brown, Public Relief, 1929-1939, 101. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 103. 
45 Ibid. 118. 
46 Ibid. 110. 
47 Ibid. 111. 
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argued that states would supplement local funds if necessary.  These denied the existence 
of “pauper or helpless states” and flatly refused to support increased federal spending.  
Supporters of proposed legislation including Costigan, La Follete and New York Senator 
Robert Wagner argued their position based on an established record of inadequate local 
relief across the nation.48  Citing the mounting inability of local welfare structures to 
shoulder increasing relief needs through 1930 and 1931, proponents of the legislation 
argued that without Federal aid localities would continue in an endless cycle of “depleted 
buying power, delinquent taxes, bankrupt municipalities and inadequate relief.”49  On 
multiple occasions the TERA was presented on the national stage as an example of how 
national funding could and would help state and local relief structures to function more 
easily.50   
With the election of New York’s Governor Roosevelt to the Presidency in 
November of 1932, the conservatism of the Hoover administration was replaced with a 
new liberalism heavily influenced by Roosevelt’s work as Governor.  As such, 
approximately two months after the 1932 Presidential election, on January 3rd of 1933 
Congress assembled to hear arguments for and against a new bill designed to establish a 
federal system of funding for state and local relief.51  Following a year of continued bank 
failures, increased relief loads and decreased public relief appropriations, the January 
hearings revealed a situation more dire than that which had presented itself a year earlier.  
Testimony from Senator Costigan, the American Association of Social Workers, and the 
United States Conference of Mayors highlighted sharply decreasing local standards of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid. 113-117; Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism, 29. 
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50 S. 174 and S. 262, p. 85. Testimony of Paul Kellogg in Brown, Public Relief, 1929-1939, 116-117. 
51Brown, Public Relief, 1929-1939, 136. 
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relief and cuts to recreational health and education programs and argued fervently for 
passage of the legislation.52  TERA Director Harry Hopkins testified regarding his 14 
months at the helm of New York State’s relief administration.53  Hopkins projected the 
relationship between local and state authorities under the TERA to the potential situation 
between state and federal administrators under the proposed national system.  In closing 
his testimony, he recommended to the Congress the establishment of a federal relief 
apparatus with wide powers parallel to those authorized under the New York State ERA 
of 1931 and wholly endorsed the approval of the bill under examination.54  On March 
21st, 1933, President Roosevelt submitted his final plan for federal relief to Congress.  
Swayed by the testimonies of Hopkins and others, on May 8th and 9th the Congress passed 
the Federal Emergency Relief Act.  On May 12th, President Roosevelt signed the act into 
law, awarding $500,000,000 in unexpended Reconstruction Finance Corporation funds 
for the purposes of federal relief.55 
 With the creation of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration under the 
Federal Emergency Relief Act, Harry Hopkins vacated his position as TERA director in 
order to take charge of the new Federal equivalent in Washington, D.C.  Famously, in his 
first two hours as FERA administrator, Hopkins distributed approximately $5,336,317 for 
projects and work in eight states, exhausting slightly over one percent of the entire FERA 
budget in a quarter of a workday.56  Of greater significance for New York, as the Hopkins 
era at the TERA closed so too did the program’s independence.  Though FERA, 
according to the TERA manual of Procedures, possessed “no constitutional or statutory 	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authority whatever over the New York State TERA,” the organization “exercise(d) a very 
practical control by virtue of its discretion as to the granting and withholding of Federal 
relief funds.”57   
When entering the FERA leadership, Hopkins exhibited a clear preference for 
funding work relief over direct relief endeavors.  Believing direct relief to sacrifice an 
individual’s spirit in order to save his or her body, Hopkins advocated for the provision of 
unemployed workers with employment at an “assured wage.”58 This solution, the 
Director believed, would “save both the body and the spirit.”59  As a result, to Hopkins 
FERA’s main objective was to “remove from the relief rolls and place in gainful 
occupations as many persons as possible.”60  However, the desperate relief situation 
present in the U.S. during 1933 did not allow for work relief to be pursued to the degree 
Hopkins desired.  In 1933, when the FERA became active, approximately ten percent of 
Americans existed on “bare subsistence levels” of food and income, only able to survive 
through receipt of public relief.61  For FERA, this immediate need dictated that emphasis 
be placed on the swiftly delivered direct relief as opposed to work relief, the benefits of 
which were dispensed far more slowly.62 
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As a result, for the first two years of FERA’s operation its influence on the 
procedures of TERA was virtually negligible.  Until the first complete federal takeover of 
relief by the CWA in December of 1933, the FERA’s largest influence on TERA was 
through “Special Federal Programs” developed by FERA and passed on to New York.  In 
fall of 1933 TERA created new bureaucratic divisions to tackle the execution of these 
projects.  Ranging from “College Student Aid” to distribution of surplus commodities, 
“Free Milk for Needy Children,” “Emergency Education,” “Relief to Transients,” “Rural 
Rehabilitation,” and even facilitation of the Civilian Conservation Corps.63  In reality 
few, if any, of these programs with the exceptions of transient care and the Civilian 
Conservation Corps engaged in work relief.  Even if they did, expenditure on these 
projects was, across the arc of the TERA, very little.  Between 1931 and 1935 
disbursement of funds for these programs (in New York State) reached only 2.5% of the 
whole, amounting to only $15,725,585 out of a total $932,797,000.64  Of that 
$15,725,585, only $2,762,339 was spent on programs with even the slightest capacity for 
work relief functions.65    
While during this early period TERA work relief operations existed largely 
separate from the FERA, observations from FERA field reporters provide a vital look 
into the performance of the New York program during that period.   In September of 	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1933, FERA field reporter Lorena Hickok, a confidante of Hopkins and the Roosevelts, 
embarked on a seven-day tour through upstate New York.  Visiting Corning, Rochester, 
Syracuse, Watertown, Ogdensburg, Malone and Plattsburgh, Hickok sought to ascertain 
the scope, efficiency and adequacy of the relief structure in place in the region.  In her 
report Hickok is wildly positive about the general condition of relief as it appeared in the 
cities that she visited.  “Well the relief set up in New York—which I have been told is 
considered a model for the whole country—is truly remarkable” Hickok began.  She 
lauded the relief structure and adequacy of relief in the state—so far ahead of what she 
saw in other states that there simply was no basis for comparison.66 Presented in contrast 
to paralyzing political divide in Kentucky, large unemployment organizations uniting 
against sub-par relief in West Virginia and a relief program “practically in a state of 
collapse” in Pennsylvania, she portrayed the TERA of New York is portrayed as an 
organization which is run on “a most efficient scale.”67 
Hickok described the projects undertaken during the first incarnation of TERA as 
the results of “a good deal of ingenuity, both in the kind of the projects and in the 
financing… where there is little money for materials and equipment.”  At the time of 
Hickok’s report in September of 1933, the state offered a 40% reimbursement to cities 
and counties for relief expenditures found eligible for state aid.68   Offering largely blue-
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collar, manual labor employment, the projects described in the Hickok report more often 
than not involved construction work updating the infrastructure and general aesthetic of 
the towns in which they operated. For example in Corning, a mid-sized industrial town 
located in Steuben County and supported by the glass industry, one TERA project cut out 
thousands of poplar trees whose roots were damaging the city’s sewer system.69  Workers 
then replaced the poplars with maples and elms, thereby salvaging the municipality’s 
existing infrastructure while still maintaining the city’s aesthetic charm.70  Beyond this, 
workers curbed and guttered streets; renovated, painted and cleaned the town’s health 
clinic located in city hall; and further out in the county TERA relief workers constructed 
new roads and rehabilitated the old through topping them with macadam.  These projects 
again provided work mostly for unskilled laborers as well as for a select number of 
skilled individuals.71  In the town of Fulton in Oswego County, local Episcopal clergy 
sponsored the initial cleaning and dredging of a long-soiled local lake.  After the lake was 
dredged the water was purified and a portion of the shore was transformed into a 
recreational beach for community use.72   
Hickok cited Syracuse, a city which shortly after being visited had approximately 
2,000 work relief employees, as having the most impressive work relief projects of all 
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seven cities visited during her trip.73  After a personal tour of a number of the city’s work 
projects given by County Unemployment Commissioner Crandal Melvin, Ms. Hickok 
recounted in her report what she believed to be the crown jewel of the Syracuse program 
and also “the most ambitious project” which she had seen anywhere: a six mile 
boulevard-park recreational complex constructed in the country surrounding Syracuse 
proper.  In addition to a walkway and open park area, the compound included a low-cost 
public swimming pool used by over 100,000 individuals by the end of the summer of 
1933, a reproduction “old French fort, a salt museum to honor the salt springs which 
helped to financially build Onondaga County in its earliest days, and a large athletic field 
to be used by all of the schools in the Syracuse metropolitan area.74  The project was able 
to provide a substantial amount of work for both skilled laborers like draughtsman, 
stonemasons and carpenters, as well as for the untrained, unskilled workers who 
comprised the majority of the Syracuse workforce in the early 1930’s.   
However, alongside her general acclaim Hickok pointed to a number of faults 
within the TERA with potential significance for the overall health of the program.  First 
among these problems was the issue of increasing labor organization and communist 
agitation in a number of larger upstate cities and towns.  Across the nation, the early 
1930’s witnessed a marked rise in levels of protest activities in unemployed populations.  
As early as 1929, communist led groups known as “Unemployed Councils” mobilized 
unemployed persons in massive protests against the current systems of labor and 	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ownership.75  In addition to radical leftist protest, more mainstream groups including 
veterans and organized labor engaged in widespread protests, building through the 1930’s 
and culminating with peak activity in 1939.76 In contrast to national trends, according to 
FERA reports upstate cities by and large lacked discernable signs of communist influence 
or unemployed organizations during the early 1930’s.  Altogether, in Hicock’s 
assessment, the region was populated by “pretty docile people,” unlikely to be enticed by 
radical elements.  Despite the general trend, through 1933 communist and pro-labor 
groups began to form within and infiltrate upstate communities.  In Rochester 5,500 
individuals employed on work relief projects throughout the city went on strike to 
demand a full forty cents per hour as opposed to the thirty that was the standard pay at the 
time, they succeeded.  The striking workers then demanded sixty cents.77  In Syracuse 
two communist organizers from Detroit arrived in mid-1933 to advocate to the City 
Commissioner of Public Welfare Leon H. Abbot on behalf of particular relief cases.  
According to Mr. Abbot, these individuals were both unemployed and did not plan to 
seek employment while in the city, and thus they were “run out of town” by the police.78  
In addition to these individuals, Syracuse also dealt with a Syracuse University student 
who, in the opinion of Hickok had probably “read a little Tolstoy, and perhaps a little 
Trotsky.”79  The individual, not on relief himself, held a meeting in the auditorium of 
Syracuse’s Central High School where he presented a petition to be sent to Governor 
Lehman demanding that supervisors on work relief jobs be prevented from “pushing” the 	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workers, demanding relief be more adequate, and asking something be done about a 
stalled, formerly work relief job, known as the Lay Creek Project.80  However, support 
for the student petered out quickly.  Additionally, reports from Schenectady and Buffalo 
suggested the presence of strife similar to that seen in Rochester. While organization of 
unemployed persons was not a large problem for most of the upstate region, in select 
cities administrators feared the creation of a powerful political minority from the 
groundwork laid by fringe elements.81  This potential became an area of concern for the 
program and would come to influence the shape of federal relief legislation in coming 
years. 
  Organizational issues were not the only difficulties to surface under the TERA.  
Political and administrative problems, though they did not pose a large threat to the 
overall viability of the TERA structure, complicated welfare operations in a number of 
upstate cities as a result of patronage and partisan divides.  According to the Hickok 
report, the general level of bi-partisan cooperation within the TERA on the state level 
was spectacular.  Republicans and Democrats cooperated easily, and even the Republican 
Commissioner of Public Welfare in Rochester Dr. Christopher G. Parnall was quoted as 
saying that, though a Republican man from a Republican city, when requesting assistance 
from the State TERA board, he was always treated as if he were a Democrat from a 
Democratic city.82  However, regionally, minor political manipulation did occur.  In 
Allegheny County, despite a year’s work put in to prepping, designing and shaping the 
county relief structure, the county Board of Supervisors voted to return control of relief to 
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the middle of an election year.83  In Rochester the former mayor was ousted by the 
banking community, the entire relief structure was overhauled and a new intake system 
for relief cases created.84  Beyond these two cases, in Syracuse Mayor Marvin created 
problems with his “dramatic” tendencies, and in Oswego a TERA field representative 
reported in 1933 that the situation in the city’s relief structure, reportedly the “most 
politically minded in the state,” was usually “something of a mess.”85  One particular 
instance in Syracuse, a plan to clean up, dredge and construct a new sewage disposal 
plant and sewer around Ley Creek, a project hoped to be a high employment opportunity, 
was turned over to a private contractor, the brother of a city commissioner, who used 
mostly machines and far fewer people than would have occurred should it have been 
conducted as a public work relief project.86  On the state level, delays in project approval 
from Albany impeded the progress of work relief projects all across the upstate region.  
The highly localized nature of most political problems associated with work relief, for 
better or for worse, serves as a testament to the truly decentralized structure of TERA 
outside of the approval process.  
 Along with organization and politics, as well as smaller problems including the 
limited and inconsistent nature of federal assistance and disagreement over particular 
home relief practices, two concerns spotted in the Hickok report grew to be significant 
for the later development and capabilities of the TERA.  The first was the plight of the 
upstate farmer.  In the early 1930’s within its population the state of New York counted 
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approximately 50,000 rural farm families within its borders.87  The vast majority of these 
farm families, especially in the western and northern tiers of the state, were easily 
separated into two categories of agriculturalist: subsistence and dairy.88  By 1933, in 
some parts of the state the seasonal employment which subsistence farmers once 
depended on for cash for taxes was no longer readily available.  In Steuben and 
Livingston counties, highway repair jobs once coveted by subsistence farmers were 
transferred to work relief projects.  Under the escrow system at work in these counties, 
payments for work were distributed slowly and in increments over a span of time after 
work was completed.89  This system ensured that subsistence farmers could never at any 
one time have enough liquid cash to pay their taxes.  As a result the properties of these 
farmers were put up for sale, and owners were given six months to redeem the house, 
with six percent interest added on to the original price.90  Subsistence farmers were 
ineligible for assistance through the federal farm and home loan programs, and lost their 
homes on a regular basis.91  Meanwhile, drought conditions and low milk prices in the 
northern reaches of the state prevented farmers from growing or purchasing feed for their 
herds.  As a result these farmers were forced to shoot their cows, thus decimating some of 
what contemporarily were considered “some of the finest herds in the country.92  It is true 
that the state of New York attempted to tailor some aspects of relief to farm communities, 
creating farm to market roads, transplanting families from marginal farms to subsistence 
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homesteads, repairing dilapidated farm buildings, and developing rural counties into 
more industrial centers.  However, these attempts largely fell outside of the realm of work 
relief and demonstrate the inability of work relief, as it was formulated in much of upstate 
New York, to handle the specific needs of the mixed agricultural/industrial upstate 
economy.93   
 Initially, the second of these significant troubles appears as less of a reason for 
worry and more a motive for celebration.  Despite 36.4% and 38.2% statewide 
unemployment in 1932 and 1933 respectively, compared to the rest of the nation many 
portions of upstate New York financially and economically remained in relatively secure 
in their fiscal condition.94  If we are to take as reliable the contents of a personal letter 
from Hickok, the TERA field reporter, to Eleanor Roosevelt from the same month as her 
report from upstate New York, in 1933 it appeared that in Corning, NY, where only 700 
families registered for relief and the local glassworks almost once again reached their 
1925-1927 production peak, there had barely been a Depression at all.95  In Syracuse, the 
city expended over $1,000,000 dollars for its six-mile boulevard-park project.  This sum 
was so large that in the opinion of FERA administrators, most communities even of a 
similar size to Syracuse would never be able to complete such a high-cost project.96  Even 
the reimbursement rate of 40% project cost offered by TERA was considered by FERA 
representatives at the time to be far more than could be shouldered by most states in the 
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Union.97  Deceiving in its positive appearance, the relative prosperity of New York 
ensured the eventual doom of its relief program.   The TERA was constructed to fit an 
economic situation by all accounts more prosperous than the rest of the nation.  As 
upstate cities and towns began show signs of financially instability late in late 1932 and 
through 1933, Clinton County reported $63,000 in unpaid taxes in 1932 and citizens in 
Syracuse were taxed at a rate of $5 per every $1000 in order to support work relief 
efforts, the ropes holding up the system of reimbursement began to show signs of heavy 
strain.98  And with the leaders in many northern tier communities like Ogdensburg 
predicting a heavier relief load in 1933 than in 1932, the weight on those ropes could 
only increase.99   
Despite four year’s experience in the business of work relief, by late 1933 upstate 
New York fell into fiscal crisis.  As predicted in Lorena Hickok’s 1933 report on the 
region, as New York descended further into the depths of depression its towns and 
counties were no longer capable of financially supporting work relief endeavors.  The 
situation in Montgomery County between 1933 and 1935 can be used as a clear-cut, start-
to-finish example of this phenomenon.    By the time of the WPA, Montgomery County 
desperately required new forms of externally financed work relief to provide reprieve 
from the perpetual economic drain of work program funding. In keeping with national 
trends, as early as 1933 the county exhibited signs of substantial strain in its attempt to 
adequately fund work-programs within its borders. 100  On April 13, 1933, the 	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Montgomery County Board of Supervisors appropriated $25,000 for the operation of 
projects under the auspices of the TERA.101  Still, by May 16th of that same year, the 
continuation of work relief projects required the allotment of additional funds in order to 
pay the salaries of men employed on particular project sites.102  By June 13th additional 
funding was already needed on top of that awarded less than a month earlier for the 
payment of workers employed on projects improving the grounds of the Montgomery 
County Sanatorium.103  Records show that by September 12th the situation had become 
critical.  Demonstrated by Resolutions 87, 88 and 89 of the Mont. County Board of 
Supervisors, by the early fall of 1933 the board had all but exhausted the funds necessary 
for the continuation of sufficient work relief projects within the county.  Faced with a 
$25,820.78 deficit in the County Welfare Department, the Board of Supervisors were 
forced to use $27,000 of county road funds to pay off the debt incurred by the 
department.104  The next two resolutions appropriated $10,000 “for the continuation of 
work relief projects,” and diverted $25,000 worth of county road funds for use on TERA 
functions as a result of insufficient county reserves.105  When taken in the context of 
consistent budgetary increases over the course of the four months preceding these 	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measures, the actions suggest the dire straits which the unsustainable growth of demand 
for work relief placed the rural counties of upstate New York. Unable to maintain their 
existing programs with allotted funds, the county had been forced to increase spending 
until they were unable to continue without depriving one of the county’s essential roles, 
road maintenance, of the funding necessary to carry out its functions.  As 1934 
approached, upstate communities operated under increasingly ominous circumstances. 
 Those pressures that distressed Montgomery County were felt in a similar manner 
in cities and states throughout the country.  Nationally, after a summer of promising 
industrial resurgence, domestic economic performance dropped off in the fall of 1933.106  
Employment and production declined, and in the last week of September 1933, 33% of 
all economic gains made in the four-month period between March and July of that year 
disappeared.107  In October, the Department of Commerce index of manufacturing 
production reported a score of 74, down 28 points from July’s high of 102.108  What was 
worse, despite engagement of 2,000,000 formerly jobless individuals on FERA projects 
across the country, the shortcomings of these projects were readily apparent to FERA 
administrators.109  Disparate state standards in pay and project approval resulted in many 
jobs that served little to no use for either the workers they employed or the communities 
by which they were sponsored.110  Further, in contrast to New York, administrative 
incompetence in many state relief structures across the South and West ensured that 
sizable swaths of the nation’s unemployed remained jobless and without any hope of 
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relief as cold weather approached.111  By the end of fall, mounting fear surrounding 
President Roosevelt’s first winter in office forced FERA administrators to begin work on 
a new and intensive short-term federal program designed to help unemployed families 
endure the winter of 1933-1934.112  The new program would be more top-down in design 
than the FERA, with the federal government directly controlling spending on projects and 
the employment of out of work persons.  In this manner, the Civil Works Administration 
was born. 
On November 9th, 1933,  Executive Order 6420-B officially created the Civil 
Works Administration.113  The attentions of top FERA administrators, including Harry 
Hopkins, Jacob Baker and Corrington Gil, shifted from the former program to the 
organization of the new centralized form of federal relief under the CWA.114 The main 
mission of the CWA was to “provide regular work on public works at regular wages for 
unemployed persons able and willing to work.”115 Between November 9th and March 29, 
1934 the CWA took over all relief work operations in New York, providing the upstate 
region with extensive works projects to support unemployed families through the harsh 
winter months of 1934.116  In the state of New York, the TERA assumed management of 
the CWA, and as period sources have phrased the transition “the CWA virtually absorbed 
the preceding program of work relief.”117 Projects and personnel previously hired under 
the independent TERA were transferred wholesale to work under the CWA.  Despite 
continuing the projects and maintaining the employment authorized under TERA, the 	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CWA was in many regards very different from that organization which preceded it.  The 
CWA instituted a national quota for work relief hires of 4,000,000 individuals to be filled 
by the start of January 1933.118  Individual quotas for each state were determined by 
averaging a state’s population (75% of the equation) with the number of cases open in 
that state (25% of the equation).  Under this system, New York was allotted 396,000 jobs 
under the CWA program.119  Half of the jobs were to be filled by individuals signed onto 
relief rolls on November 16th, 1933; the remaining half would be employed via public 
recruitment and labor unions.120  Perhaps most noticeable and most significant difference 
between the CWA-TERA relationship and that which was enjoyed under the FERA-
TERA relationship was the absence of monies made available for the endeavors of state, 
county or local levels of government.121 The structure was far more federally controlled 
than the FERA and would serve as a model for the future evolution of federal work 
projects, specifically the Works Progress Administration.  Additionally, in contrast to the 
budget deficit payouts allotted to workers by the TERA and the $.30 per hour minimum 
wage for all workers under the FERA, the CWA established a system of prevailing wages 
based off of the wage formula active under the Public Works Administration.122  In this 
manner the CWA for the first time provided work relief employees with a prevailing 
wage, the same system instituted for the WPA in 1935.  The CWA expended significant 
sums of money in New York at an exceptionally fast rate, exhausting $100,120,000, 
twenty-two per cent of all relief funds expended in New York State between 1931 and 
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1935, in just four months.123  The organization marked a distinct change in the manner in 
which work relief was handled in upstate New York. More than anything, the top-down 
federal control and diverse projects foreshadowed the structure of the WPA in the years 
to come.   
Montgomery County, a mid-sized county in central New York with a mixed 
agricultural and industrial economy, benefitted greatly from the CWA. The CWA 
operated a total of 114 projects in the county’s 11 cities and towns, employing a total of 
610 individuals and disbursing a total of $141,154 in wages over the course of four 
months.124  In their fundamental character, the projects executed by the CWA in upstate 
New York in many respects resembled those provided by the work relief organizations 
that preceded it.  Similar to those works completed under the TERA the overall bulk of 
CWA projects concentrated on manual labor, with average counties in the upstate area 
operating blue-collar projects over white-collar at a ratio of approximately 2 to 1.125  All 
throughout Montgomery County, cities and towns benefitted from improvements carried 
out on county and municipal roadways, water works, dams, schools, wood lots, sewers, 
forests, and even recreational facilities like the skating rink constructed in Fort 
Plain/Minden.126  Also like TERA, the CWA engaged in projects oriented towards 
professional workers in addition to their working-class focus. Apart from the Town of 
Charleston, all municipalities in Montgomery County played host to at least one 
professional project during the CWA’s operation, with all but Glen and Mohawk 	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sponsoring bookbinding assignments and all except Palatine and Canajoharie engaging in 
work involving the compilation of historical archives.127  Additionally, the county’s 
CWA projects employed clerical workers for the Department of Public Welfare and 
County Clerk’s office, nurses for public health clinics, and even census aids.128 
By mid-December it became evident to Federal administrators that this initial 
appropriation of $400,000,000 allotted to the WPA in November would not carry the 
program through the winter as had been initially planned.129  To compensate, starting on 
January 18th hours were curtailed.130  On February 15th workers already employed 
elsewhere but receiving work on the CWA were discharged from project payrolls.  On 
March 2nd, wage cuts were instituted in order to prolong the program’s operation.131  On 
March 31st, the program officially closed shop and the main responsibility for work relief 
in New York returned to the TERA/FERA organization, with the new “FERA Work 
Division” continuing a limited number of former CWA projects under its authority.132 
The condition of relief in upstate New York by late 1934 was mixed.  Despite FERA 
field reports from the cities of Troy, Schenectady, Gloversville, Utica, Niagara Falls, 
Corning, Elmira, Johnson City-Endicott and Massena which revealed a “rebound of 
business from panic level” to a status of “below-plateau,” by and large the relief load in 
these cities in fact rose as winter approached.  Gloversville, Utica, Niagara Falls, 
Corning, Elmira, and Messina all predicted substantial raises in the relief load during the 
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winter of 1933-1934 as compared to the year before.133  Despite the strong work 
accomplished by the CWA and the TERA before it, the trend in unemployment remained 
upward, as remained the trend in relief. 
By 1935, increasingly desperate municipal and county finances and unrelenting 
unemployment forced the state to take more dramatic action in order to keep its local 
governments fiscally solvent. TERA offered counties and individual localities seeking to 
establish work relief operations in their municipalities 75% reimbursement for all costs 
expended for pay and materials.134 In the first four months of 1935 Montgomery County 
alone managed to maintain a total of 29 fully operational work relief outfits across the 
county, 21 that were sponsored by the county itself and nine that were subsidized by 
individual localities.135   Totaling $52,249.46 in expenses, the projects at work between 
January 1, 1935 and May 1, 1935 received a grand total of $39,092.57 in funding from 
TERA.136  By comparison, for these same operations the county itself expended a mere 
$10,882.05, while individual towns and villages contributed $1,974.84.137  The physical 
accomplishments that resulted from TERA work in upstate New York are astounding. 
Between April 1934 and June 1935 TERA crews constructed or improved approximately 
4,094 miles of roads, streets, and highways; 405 miles of sidewalks, paths and trails, 313 
bridges, 4,878 public buildings, 630 major recreational facilities, and countless sewage 	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plants, water lines, sewer lines, drainage ditches, reservoirs, and garbage disposal 
plants.138  The organization even planted 1,013,000 trees, shrubs and vines.139   
The projects conducted under TERA in upstate New York were diverse in both 
character and purpose.   The lion’s share of endeavors undertaken by workers under the 
combined TERA/FERA were of a similar stripe to those pursued by the CWA and by the 
TERA on its own.  By and large projects tended to be tailored to the skills and experience 
of the blue-collar worker, focusing on tasks favorable to unskilled workers able to engage 
in manual labor to improve the infrastructure and public appearance of the communities 
in which they functioned.  In the first four months of 1935, Montgomery County 
employees engaged in work improving County Roads 35, 53, 90, and 103; in reforesting 
the land surrounding the County Sanatorium; in renovating public buildings including the 
White House in Canajoharie, the County Court House in Fonda, and the St. Johnsville 
Community House; and even in the construction of public facilities like the Fort Johnson 
School and a water reservoir and skating rink in Canajoharie.140  But projects were not 
limited to manual pursuits.  Administrators worked to accommodate formerly white-
collar workers trained in professional skills who were adversely affected by the 
Depression.  Administrative positions in bookbinding, record keeping, the County 
Clerk’s office, and Public Welfare among other occupations provided white-collar 
workers in the overwhelmingly blue-collar Montgomery County with a handful of 
positions to address their specific needs.141  In addition to traditional manual/professional 
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occupational offerings, TERA projects often worked to provide depressed communities 
with services oriented toward practical aid.  In Montgomery County, subsistence gardens, 
sewing rooms, logging/wood lot operations, and gravel beds provided both work and 
material relief to families lacking clothing, food, and fuel.142  Beyond simply aiding 
upstate New York’s unemployed population, the work conducted by TERA funded 
projects represented an evolutionary step in the path to the style of work relief provided 
by the WPA.  Despite engaging in labor for wages in a manner similar to that found in 
private industry, TERA workers in Montgomery County received compensation 
according to assessed need on a scale of six, eight, and twelve dollar “budgetary 
deficiency.”143  Nevertheless, the categorical breadth and scale of TERA funded projects 
in the pre-WPA era testify to the highly developed nature of work relief in upstate New 
York prior to the WPA.  
After the end of the CWA the Montgomery County was again required to award 
$15,000 to the continuation of work relief programs in the district.  By April 12th, 1934, 
the county was forced to offer the sum of $25,000 to pay off debts incurred as a result of 
relief spending in the previous year.144  It is clear that by 1934, work relief had become a 
millstone around the neck of the county, dragging it toward financial ruin and the 
inability to function.145  The increasingly reckless behavior of Montgomery County 
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officials demonstrates that up to a year before the creation of the WPA, upstate New 
York was in frantic need of aid to remain solvent despite still increasing work relief 
obligations.  It is obvious that New York State, between 1931 and 1935, developed a 
highly advanced and influential system of work relief for those citizens living inside its 
cities and towns.  Work was diverse, readily available, and paid up to sixteen dollars per 
week for work done on relief projects, a full two dollars more than the average minimum 
wage for private industry in 1933.146  However, the system New York created was simply 
too ambitious for its own financial capabilities.  Reasonable though its precepts were at 
the programs inception, as the upstate New York declined to the level of depression felt 
in nearby states and counties began to turn bankrupt, the system could not support itself.  
What is worse, those efforts that the TERA made to aid districts no longer able to afford 
60% share of project costs by lowering sponsor contributions to 25% only served to 
accelerate the money loss of the entire system.  By mid 1935 upstate New York required 
significant outside help in order to continue aiding its relief population.  
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Chapter 3: 1935 and the Birth of The WPA 
 
  
As night descended on Washington, DC the evening of January 4th, 1935, in a 
similar fashion the city’s political and social elite fell upon the chambers of the U.S. 
Capitol Building.  Quickly, the galleries overlooking the U.S. House of Representatives 
filled with eager eyed and civically inclined civilians, while the seats below stood empty, 
ready to be occupied by members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate.1  
Before long however, the designated occupants of these seats filed into position as well, 
with Representatives and Senators entering the chamber from their respective sides of the 
Capitol.  As the crowd sat waiting, The President of the United States Franklin D. 
Roosevelt made his way to the Capitol.  Upon his arrival, with some assistance the 
President approached the podium situated at the front of the chamber.  After a minute of 
pleasantry exchange between the Roosevelt, Vice President Garner and Speaker of the 
House Joseph W. Byrns, the Commander in Chief took the stage. The President’s annual 
address to the 73rd Congress of the United States was about to begin.2   
The President’s remarks opened with what, by 1935, had become relatively 
boilerplate statements on the nation’s economic and political condition. However, a third 
of the way through his speech, Roosevelt began to speak about the pursuit of the 
“security of the men, women and children of the nation,” presenting the concept as the 
primary task of the government in 1935 and arguing that “every major legislative 
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enactment” of the 74th Congress should work toward that end.3  Building on this notion, 
the President reviewed the nation’s past and current recovery efforts.  Stressing the work 
of the NIRA and FERA, Roosevelt argued that the direct relief programs which had 
typified relief efforts since the beginning of the depression had thus far been inadequate 
in providing aid to struggling persons.  Further, the president voiced concerns about the 
potential for home relief to demoralize workers and engender a debilitating dependency 
on the federal government among those who received it.  Concluding his remarks on the 
dangers of home relief, the President advanced to propose the legislative agenda for 
which the speech, and in part his Presidency, would eventually come to be remembered 
for. 
  Declaring, “The Federal Government must and shall quit this business of relief,” 
Roosevelt presented a plan whereby “local responsibility” for direct welfare would 
resume and “with the exception of the normal public building operations of the 
Government, all emergency public works shall be united in a single new and greatly 
enlarged plan.”4  This plan, seeking to engage the 3,500,000 employable but unemployed 
Americans, would supersede the FERA with a centrally administered, top-down relief 
structure.  Projects under the new program were to 1) provide “permanent improvement” 
to national living conditions, 2) provide compensation larger than current direct relief 
payments, but not so considerable as to dissuade workers from accepting private 
employment, 3) emphasize direct labor, 4) be largely self-liquidating, 5) not compete 
with private industry, 6) assure work to current relief recipients for the coming year, and 
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7) operate in communities “where they will serve the greatest unemployment needs” as 
depicted by the current relief rolls.5   
Suggesting a price tag of $4 billion, the President put into motion the initial 
groundwork for what, in four months time, would develop into the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA).6  For the nation, this would mean seven years of massive public 
work relief projects in every state, county and community.  In upstate New York, the 
program would bring about a dramatic transformation in the administration of work 
relief.  Initially, the implementation of the WPA would confuse and create anxiety among 
New York relief administrators on both the town and state levels. However, by the end of 
1935, the Works Progress Administration would come to occupy an integral role in the 
upstate relief structure, one that both benefited the state through the flexible creation of 
projects and caused tensions as a result of its top-down bureaucratic structure and control 
of funding. 
The theoretical origins of a centralized federal works program trace back to the 
period that directly followed the conclusion the Civil Works Administration.   Through 
1934, former TERA, CWA and FERA administrator Harry Hopkins pressured the 
President for a continued and enlarged federal jobs program.7  By mid-April, Hopkins 
confided to select colleagues his belief that Roosevelt now supported an extended works 
program, one which might cost as much as six billion dollars and span several years.8  In 
the spring of 1934 the FERA studied workers on relief rolls in 79 cities spanning the 
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United States to assess the current state of relief across the nation.9  These studies 
examined race, industry, white-collar/blue collar employment, gender, age, wage and 
skill; compiling data by which the FERA administration could “take the relief people out 
of the realm of unreality.”10  The data from the FERA studies were used to help shape a 
broader reconstruction of federal relief, meant not only to alter work relief, but to work 
towards the creation of a permanent safety net for the unemployed.  However, analysis by 
upper level FERA officials regarding the appropriate shape of the proposed 
reorganization of federal work relief did not begin in earnest until September of 1934.11   
From September through December, the FERA and the Committee on Economic 
Security (CES), a commission whose main board included Hopkins and whose inner 
committees were filled with FERA administrators and alumni, researched the issue of 
how to remodel the Federal government’s relationship with relief.12  Just before 
Christmas of 1934 the Committee submitted to the President its official recommendations 
for the restructuring of federal relief policy.  In its report the committee provided the 
administration with a wide proposal for a program of “employment assurance.”13 The 
first aspect of the proposed set up called for a general expansion of public employment 
whenever private employment should slack.  In general, the committee suggested that 
work relief replace direct relief wherever possible, and advocated for the creation of 
public works designed to absorb both blue-collar and white-collar individuals who 
occupied relief rolls.14 The second part of the committee’s proposals appealed for new 
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payroll taxes to be used to fund unemployment compensation for out-of-work individuals 
as well as a program of old age insurance.15 To analyze the Committee’s report, 
Roosevelt called together a small advisory group including Hopkins, the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Director of the Budget to assess the situation and make further 
suggestions for the new shape of federal relief. In their most basic elements, the 
recommendations made by the CES would with time develop into the basis for the Works 
Progress Administration and the Social Security Act.16  
Despite these recommendations, by the time of the President’s address on January 
4th of 1935, the definite mechanisms of the new work program were not yet decided.17  
For the first three months of 1935 debate raged over questions essential to the 
formulation of the relief structure.  Should the new program seek the revival of heavy 
industries or should it aim simply to employ as many individuals on relief rolls as 
possible, thus enabling rapid reinvestment of funds into local economies?18  What sort of 
projects should be created? How should they be funded and should their emphasis be on 
constructing worthwhile projects or producing mass employment opportunities? Beyond 
these questions, the issues of project self-liquidation, wages, capital reimbursement, rural 
rehabilitation, who to employ, how long the program should last, how much money 
would be available for the program, and how the administration should be organized all 
needed to be considered before any concrete plan could be adequately articulated.19  
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Over Christmas week of 1934, a Joint Resolution was drafted by an interagency 
coalition and introduced to Congress as H.J.R. 117 on January 21st 1935.20  Proposing a 
relief program costing four billion dollars with $880,000,000 from previous 
appropriations, H.J.R. 117 disappeared into the depths of committee and sub-committee 
negotiations.21  Eleven weeks later, the newly titled Emergency Relief Appropriations 
Act emerged from the Senate.  Offering $4.8 billion to be spent on work relief, the 
compromise bill also included the requirement that workers receive a  “security wage” 
lower than current prevailing wages and the condition that the Senate approve all 
appointed positions paying over $5,000.22 It is important to note, however, that wage 
scales were developed in each region according to prevailing wages as a result of 
compromise language in the act requiring the President to fix wages at a level that did 
“not affect adversely or otherwise tend to decrease the going rate of wages.”23   On April 
8th, 1935, President Roosevelt passed the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act into Law. 
24 
  With the new work relief endeavor now funded by the Congress, President 
Roosevelt turned to arranging the administrative structure of his organization.  The 
President valued the swift employment and high proportion of costs dedicated to labor 
associated with “light public works,” the kind of which were undertaken by TERA, 
FERA and the CWA.  As a result Roosevelt selected the former director of each of those 
organizations, Harry Hopkins, to man the helm of the new relief structure.25  Technically 
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speaking, Hopkins would serve only as leader of one part of a three-part administration.  
Named Director of the program’s Works Progress Division, Hopkins was placed in 
charge of “tracking work projects and keeping them moving on schedule.”26  The second 
division of the organization, the Division of Applications, was headed by Frank Walker 
and was designed to make initial approvals and rejections of project applications 
submitted by state, county and local sponsors.27  The third partition of the program, the 
Advisory Committee on Allotments, was managed by PWA director Harold Ickes, and 
brought together representatives from across the public and private sectors to meet 
weekly and send recommendations on projects to the President for approval.28  With the 
general structure complete, on May 6th 1935 President Roosevelt signed the Executive 
Order that created the new relief organization.  The Works Division, known now as the 
Works Progress Administration, quickly overshadowed its two peers and became the 
nation’s primary proprietor of work relief.29   
Hopkins wasted no time in beginning the transition of Federal relief from the 
FERA to the WPA.  In mid-May Hopkins brought to the WPA former FERA 
administrators Aubrey Williams, Corrington Gill and Jacob Baker as well as Ellen S. 
Woodward, the former head of women’s and professional works under the FERA.30  On 
June 16th of 1935 Hopkins assembled fifty individuals selected to head WPA operations 
in each of the fifty states, known as State Administrators, at the Mayflower Hotel in 
Washington, DC for a four-day conference explaining the general work of the WPA and 
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the roles administrators would play in the states that they represented.31  The first day of 
the conference featured a total of eight speakers, each presenting on a different facet of 
the WPA.  First to speak, Hopkins made remarks regarding the general scope of the 
W.P.A.’s responsibility, organization and administration.  The main goal of the program 
Hopkins told the audience would be to “take 3,500,000 men and women who are now 
(were then) on relief throughout the nation and put them to work at useful public work.”32  
This task, according to Hopkins, was to be conducted through existing governmental 
agencies in a manner in contradiction to FERA policy whereby grants were made to 
states for work conducted by individuals classified as state employees.33  By contrast, the 
individuals working for the WPA, with the exception of those employed under contract, 
would be federal employees—receiving federal checks, federal benefits, and federal 
compensation.34  To ensure that projects met every criterion for WPA funding the 
administration would require each project, after initial approval, to be supervised, 
managed, and periodically inspected by WPA administrative employees.  In addition to 
these requirements the WPA would be obligated to “report to the president at regular 
intervals upon the progress of all the projects going on in the United States.” These 
reports would update the President regarding the number of men of men and women at 
work and the amount of money spent by the administration.”35   
The focus of the new program would be on swift and mass direct federal 
employment and project creation.  Unlike the PWA or other heavy-industry focused 
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programs, the WPA’s definition of employment included only jobs explicitly created on 
the projects approved by the Administration.  Rather than indirect job creation, the WPA 
would concern itself strictly with immediate employment opportunities for those 
individuals already known to be on relief rolls. These persons were to move from the 
relief rolls to direct employment on jobs expressly created by the WPA for that purpose.  
While admitting that indirect employment was inevitable, in his remarks Hopkins 
explicitly stated that “men on the relief rolls that may get jobs in other ways” were not 
the priority of the WPA.36  The character of the jobs created by the organization would be 
varied and flexible depending on the needs of the particular project’s sponsoring agents. 
As Hopkins’ in his review of Federal work relief during the Great Depression, Spending 
To Save, these projects would have three primary criteria in their creation and approval.  
First, “The number of eligible relief workers in the locality.”  Second, “their skills.” And 
third, “the kind of project will be of the greatest usefulness to the community.”37  
The first of these criteria, that which placed emphasis on a district's volume of 
eligible relief cases, would come to ensure the greater size of relief structures and 
programs in cities and heavily populated sections of country as compared to rural regions 
with low population density.  Hopkins’ second requirement would have ramifications for 
the diversity of projects and occupational skills provided for by said projects in each 
community.  The third prerequisite, that which specified each project must be of 
considerable utility to the municipality in which it operated, restricted communities from 
engaging in projects in the vein of street cleaning, garbage removal and snow removal—
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the hallmarks of make work and previous work relief ventures.38 In this manner, the 
emphasis in the WPA was placed on more permanent projects, those that invested in 
municipalities’ long-term stability and well-being.  While Hopkins’ criterion for 
appropriate, labor-intensive projects might appear to be relatively restrictive, their effect 
in shaping WPA policy had great effect on the development of relief operations in upstate 
New York.  The guidelines ensured that, in a region characterized by wide tracts of open 
farmland interspersed with regions of intense industrial development, at times in the same 
county, project funding would go by and large to sizable cities rather than to more thinly 
populated rural locales.  More importantly though, the focus on projects representing the 
greatest usefulness to the community in which they operated created a space for 
flexibility between the urban and rural areas of New York, an elasticity that during the 
WPA’s upstate operations would ensure the establishment of appropriate projects to 
accommodate both sides of New York’s population. 
Following Hopkins’ speech, employees and administrators received lectures on 
“Intake policies and procedures, transition from relief to work status, educational 
programs, and transient programs” from Mr. Williams; professional and service policies 
from Mr. Baker;  “reporting, accounting, disbursing, liaison with other work agencies, 
and research” from Mr. Gil; and women’s work from Mrs. Woodward.39  Over the next 
three days of the conference, administrators broke up into smaller groups based on 
regional administrative divisions created by the WPA in order to more easily manage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Though other restrictions on project type were not specified, Hopkins articulated that administrators 
could “undoubtedly think up some fancy thing that is illegal, but not many,” assuming that the projects 
were all public in character.  Conference Transcript, Preliminary Staff Conference, June 16th, 1935, Box 25, 
Folder: “Administrators’ Conferences, June 16-19, 1935, Folder 2,” Hopkins Collection, FDRL. 11,12. 
39 Conference Transcript, Preliminary Staff Conference, June 16th, 1935, Box 25, Folder: “Administrators’ 
Conferences, June 16-19, 1935, Folder 2,” Hopkins Collection, FDRL. 
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operations.  Group 1, consisting of New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and 
Maryland, met with Regional Chairman R.C. Branion to listen to a second series of more 
detailed lectures regarding many of the topics touched on in the addresses given the 
conference’s first day.40  The group heard in-depth information regarding Emergency 
Education Programs, transients, reemployment, professional service projects, wage scale 
and labor relations, project safety, women’s work and reporting, accounting, disbursing, 
procurement, investigation and compensation.41 In the weeks and months after the 
conference, administrators were provided with more specific guidelines for the many of 
the program’s essential functions.  As state directors became better informed regarding 
sponsor contributions, funding, hiring, project applications and the process of transition 
from FERA to the WPA, each state developed its own .42 
As early as mid-May of 1935, New York State TERA administrators, made 
nervous by rumors surrounding the “new business” of work relief created by the ERAA 
and the President’s May 6th executive order, began to make inquiries of the Federal 
government in order to better ascertain the situation into which they would be soon be 
stepping.  On May 13th, only a week after the program officially came into existence, 
New York TERA Chairman Alfred P. Schoellkopf contacted Hopkins to inquire as to 
“instructions” or “more definite” information pertaining to the new program.43  In 
response to Mr. Schoellkopf’s probing, Hopkins explained to the Chairman that he had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 This would eventually morph into Region One.   
41 Conference Transcript, Preliminary Staff Conference, June 16th, 1935, Box 25, Folder: “Administrators’ 
Conferences, June 16-19, 1935, Folder 2,” Hopkins Collection, FDRL 
42 According to Hopkins in Spending To Save, approximately 90% of all WPA employees were to be 
drafted directly from relief rolls.  In addition to this, sponsor contributions were required only to the fullest 
extent to which a sponsor could offer to afford.   
43 Telephone conversation, Mr. Schoellkopf to Mr. Hopkins 5/13/35, Box 76, Folder: “New York,” 
Hopkins Collection, FDRL 
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not “quite decided how to operate in New York” as of that point in time.44  All that he 
could offer Schoellkopf was word that he would meet with an engineer on the matter 
shortly and that he had heard from the Governor that the state preferred “that the TERA 
not have anything to do with it (the new program),” an assertion that surprised 
Schoellkopf.45  
Worried by the uncertainty surrounding the transition process from FERA to the 
WPA, the Schoellkopf requested that Hopkins let the TERA know the planned 
organization in New York prior to any other body, political or otherwise so enable the 
TERA to remain in control over the powerful relief structure that existed in New York 
City. Though its relationship with the TERA was not distinct from those enjoyed by any 
of New York’s many other large cities, the EWB of New York City received and 
expended more TERA funding than any other single municipality in the New York State.  
In the period between September 1, 1934 and August 31, 1935 the NYC EWB spent 
$81,456,580.48 on work relief projects within the city, approximately 62% of total state 
expenditures for the same period.46  As such, ambiguity regarding the transition from the 
FERA to the WPA prompted concern among state TERA administrators over the future 
of the administration’s ability to control New York City.  Fearing several months of 
insubordination from NYC should city officials receive first word on WPA policies, 
Schoellkopf sought to ensure that the state TERA administration was the firstpoint of 
contact of any and all structural plans for the WPA in the state of New York.47  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 New York State, Public Unemployment Relief in New York State—Fourth Year; September 1, 1935-
August 31, 1935 (Albany: TERA, 1935), 36-37. 
47 Ibid. 
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Schoellkopf also questioned Hopkins regarding the advance submission of 
ongoing TERA proposals as project applications for work to be done under the WPA.   
Despite his belief that the projects in question would “qualify under the new program,” 
Schoellkopf was instructed to merely earmark potential programs for the time being, 
holding them until the WPA was scheduled to start on July 1st.48 On June 20th 
Schoellkopf again contacted Hopkins in attempt to receive more definite information 
about the WPA’s planned operations for New York State, and was only offered 
reassurance that the program would “put some people to work.”49  Schoellkopf’s 
persistence in questioning Hopkins regarding the future of relief in New York State 
illustrates the uncertain feeling among New York administrators even two months prior 
to the real start of the WPA’s operations.  The TERA was anxious to begin the transition 
process as soon as possible, and the vagueness of plans caused administrators to agonize 
over what affect the changeover might have on the TERA’s ability to adequately manage 
its current affairs and over the fate of government subsidization of direct relief uncertain 
after the strictly work-oriented WPA. 
Interestingly, at no point in the conversation did Hopkins make clear whether his 
inability to offer Schoellkopf information regarding the WPA’s operations in New York 
was due to general uncertainty surrounding state-level implementation nation-wide or if it 
came as a result of the specific conditions present in New York State.  While it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid. Hopkins stated that if Schoellkopf were to submit a proposal at the present time, the administration 
“would just send them back.” 
49 It appears that Schoellkopf’s inquiries regarding the future relief set up in New York State were so 
persistent that Hopkins grew short in his responses when questioned.  To Schoellkopf’s June 20th attempt, 
Hopkins replied “I haven’t anything more definite, except that we are going to put some people to work but 
I don’t know how many.  I can’t tell that.  You are in the same boat as everybody in every state in the 
Union.  I can’t make a firm commitment now as to how many I will put to work.”  The statement shows 
obvious annoyance with Schoellkopf and is particularly blunt. Telephone conversation, Mr. Schoellkopf to 
Mr. Hopkins 6/20/35, Box 76, Folder: “New York,” Hopkins Collection, FDRL 
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certainly true that New York would eventually become the only state to separate into two 
distinct administrative structures, one for upstate and one for New York City, there is not 
significant evidence to show that set up in the state suffered or was delayed as a result of 
division between the two regions or to an extent any worse than occurred in other states.50 
On June 20tth, 1935 Hopkins told Schoellkopf that as TERA director he was “in the same 
boat as everybody in every state in the Union.”51  This remark implies that earlier 
assertions made by Hopkins, specifically those in which he professed an inability to make 
firm commitments on employment quotas or offer any more definite information on 
transitional procedures, likely reflected the condition of the WPA as a whole and not the 
particular situation faced in New York State.52 
In New York, city and county administrators, as well as average citizens, 
exhibited a similar impatience in the wait for new information regarding the coming 
changes in relief in the state.  Starting in June of 1935, local media outlets began to report 
on developments in the transition from the FERA to the WPA.  On Friday, June 21st the 
Troy Times Record stated that new and highly anticipated information regarding the 
WPA would be released to the public the following Monday.  However, at the time of the 
article’s publication, the Times Record still knew very little about the WPA.  Other than 
that readers could expect further information soon, the paper was only able to relay little 
more than the name of the program.  Despite having scarse substantive intelligence on the 
new relief set-up, the demand for new WPA material was so great that the article went to 
press anyway.  The piece also included a statement from the city EWB stating that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Taylor, American-Made, 187. 
51 Telephone conversation, Mr. Schoellkopf to Mr. Hopkins 6/20/35, Box 76, Folder: “New York,” 
Hopkins Collection, FDRL 
52 Ibid. 
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bureau’s administrative personnel knew so little about the bureau’s fate with the coming 
WPA, that they speculated that they might be “scrapped entirely.”53  
 On June 26, while covering news that New York cities had been called to submit 
to the WPA their “worthwhile projects” for consideration in an attempt to “speed up New 
York State’s public improvement program,” The Binghamton Press also reported on a 
number of other program updates of varying importance for both potential workers and 
perspective sponsors.  For administrators and sponsors, the paper’s news that projects 
would have to be submitted to the administration’s state and national offices for approval 
and that no quota had yet been set for upstate employment or funds had not yet been 
added little insight that might be useful for future project planning.  However, reports that 
New York’s wage scale would be “lower than some other sections of the country” and 
that WPA employees would not be included on relief rolls, would not considered relief 
cases and would therefore not be subject to home investigations carried great significance 
for employable individuals at that time dependent on relief.54  The news conveyed to 
workers the WPA’s emphasis on the dignity of recipients of employment on its projects 
and provided valuable insight into what sort of compensation might be expected for those 
who became employed on administration projects.  
Of particular importance for the future of works projects in upstate New York, on 
August 1 WPA Director Hopkins pronounced that the administration was to “put 
emphasis on rural work.”    Hopkins stated that plans had been drafted for “a wide variety 
of pick and shovel projects, with a special emphasis on farm to market roads” in “open 
country” areas. Hopkins pointed also pointed to “small dams, levees, rebuilding streets, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 “New Relief Plan Expected To Be Revealed Monday,” The Times Record (Troy) June 21st, 1935, page 
13.  
54 “Cities of State Are Asked for Works Plans,” The Binghamton Press June 26, 1935, 15. 
	   80	  
waterworks and sewage disposal, extension of lighting systems, community sanitation 
projects, recreational projects, stream pollution control and sanitary surveys” as examples 
of projects designed to fill the employment and community needs of increasingly 
destitute rural populations.55  This proclamation from Hopkins set an informal template 
for rural work in New York and accurately predicted many of the specific projects 
conducted in the upstate region over the course of the WPA’s operation.   
As summer continued, administrators at last began to receive more specific 
instructions for how to handle the turnover of relief from the FERA to the WPA.  
Through August, counties throughout New York engaged in active planning for the 
transition from TERA-Works Division projects to those funded and operated by the 
WPA.  By August 2 the state TERA announced plans and procedures for the carryover of 
existing state relief projects through the start of the WPA period.  Work relief project 
sponsors and work bureau chairmen were instructed to turn their efforts to the submission 
of project applications to the WPA in attempt to authorize a transfer of their projects to 
the administration, and were warned to draft plans to “take care of the workers” active on 
current projects should applications be denied.   In a letter to sponsors and bureau chairs, 
Executive Director of the TERA Fred Daniels warned that the Temporary Emergency 
Relief Administration could not assure the availability of state funds for the continuation 
of existing work relief projects past August.56 However, Daniels could ensure the 
unavailability of state monies for any and all projects begun after August 31st.57 By mid-
month the preparation and authorization of WPA projects statewide was well underway.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 “WPA To Put Emphasis on Rural Work,” Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, 8/1/35   See also “Farmers 
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56 “Regulations for Work Relief announced to Sponsors, Chairs,” Canandaigua Daily Messenger, August 
2nd, 1935, Page 3 
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In Ontario County, by August 16th the county WPA Director had already surveyed 25 
different WPA projects across his district, 10 sponsored by the County itself and 15 
sponsored by individual townships.58  The TERA held a portion of active projects in 
TERA control until September 1st in order to continue work on the projects.59  But when 
the TERA ceased funding of work relief projects on the first of September, the WPA 
came into full operation in upstate New York. 
 For the duration of 1935, the WPA rapidly expanded the program of public works 
in upstate New York.  Targeted by federal, state and local sponsors to fill the specific 
needs of individual localities and unemployed populations, the projects that began in 
1935 offered diverse employment opportunities for out-of-work individuals.  
Montgomery County started 106 works programs throughout the county and within each 
of its 10 municipalities during the last five months of 1935.  Employment opportunities 
were created for all occupational backgrounds and were tailored by the county and by 
each town to the specific needs of their communities.  Amsterdam, the only city in the 
county, accounted for fifty-six of the county’s work projects.  While these Amsterdam 
projects varied, the vast majority can be classified as manual labor executed by unskilled 
laborers.  In 1935 the city of Amsterdam sponsored 28 separate roadwork projects spread 
out through the whole of the city.  Roadways like Clizbe Avenue and Church Street were 
curbed, graded and resurfaced, intersections were widened to ease congestion, and in the 
cases of town roads Nos. 1 through No. 8, repairs were made, paths were corrected and 
surrounding areas were landscaped and drained to facilitate safer and more reliable travel 
routes on the outskirts of the town.  Beyond roadwork, the city employed workers on 15 	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separate sewer extension projects; repaired a culvert damaged by spring flooding at the 
city reservoir; began construction of a new athletics complex; renovated and painted city 
hall, its annex and the city firehouse; operated a gravel pit; and continued work on a 
former TERA/FERA project, an 18-hole municipal golf course “located adjacent to the 
northerly boundary of the city.60  The occupational needs of women and professional 
workers were addressed through two separate allocations for city-sewing rooms, the 
institution of a city-level WPA nurse program, attendants at recreational facilities, and the 
indexing and filing of city historical records by former clerical workers.61 The wide range 
of projects undertaken in the city provided its unemployed with a variety of employment 
opportunities within their individual occupational skill sets.  
 The more rural communities of Montgomery County created 50 projects 
throughout the course of 1935.  These town-sponsored projects in many ways mirrored 
the recommendations for rural projects provided by Harry Hopkins that August.  Road 
work was conducted in each of the county’s rural communities with particular attention 
to county farm-to-market roads like County Road #75-2 in the Town of Florida, County 
Roads including #103 in Fonda, gravel roads through the farm-heavy Town of Minden, 
and repaired county roads in the town of Root.62  Community sanitation projects like the 
installation of waterlines, sanitary sewers, and storm sewers in Canajoharie, basic sewer 
improvements in Fonda, the installation of storm sewers in Fort Plain, installation of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 As it appears in the body of Mayor Carter of Amsterdam’s 1935 “Mayor’s Address to the Common 
Council of the City of Amsterdam:” “For many years there has been considerable discussion relative to 
building a municipal golf course for this city…. On December 12th (1934) you authorized the acquisition of 
182.271 acres of land as recommended and at an aggregate cost of $14,866.24.”  “The Mayor’s Address to 
the Common Council of the City of Amsterdam,” in Proceedings of the Common Council, 1935, City of 
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water supply for Palatine Bridge and malaria control in Fonda for the first time brought to 
many of these communities municipal water supply, with “complete fire protection” and 
“adequate house service” and modernized sewer systems.63  Flood control measures in St. 
Johnsville and Canajoharie, the former via a creek-deepening project and the latter 
through the construction of a retaining wall along the Canajoharie Creek, protected and 
repaired the small communities following minor damages resulting from heavy rains in 
July of 1935 which devastated much of Central and Western New York.64  The rural 
towns of Montgomery County also sponsored projects including sewing rooms, tax-map 
reassessment, and field surveys to employ women and professional workers.65   
 The county itself sponsored a large number of projects very similar to those 
initiated by its individual municipalities.  Over the course of the year, the county Board 
of Supervisors sponsored a total of 16 projects with work designed for manual laborers, 
professional class individuals, and women.66  Manual laborers in both cities and rural 
areas were provided with projects for the repair of county roads, especially farm-to-
market roads, not included in the Federal Aid System, for the landscaping and improving 
of county highways along with adjacent public property, operation of gravel pits, 
sidewalk improvement, and the rehabilitation of cemeteries.67  These workers were also 
tasked with providing aid to affected communities in the direct aftermath of July 1935 
flooding. 68  For former clerical and professional workers, the county sponsored a number 





67 Ibid. The Federal-Aid System was a network of highways whose maintenance and updating was already 
accounted for under the Federal-Aid Highway Program started under the Wilson Administration in 1916. 
68 Ibid. 
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offered.  Jobs offered for these workers ranged from the inventory and classification of 
“all public records of county, town, village and public collections” to resurveys of county 
and town lines, to brainstorming of how to revitalize “the normal flow of private capital” 
in order to kindle recovery in employment in “building and allied trades.”69  For what 
was considered women’s work, the county sponsored countywide sewing room 
operations as well as nursing and bedside services for those on relief within the county.70  
Beyond the county, in the field of education the state sponsored emergency nursery 
school programs and, recognizing the special needs of out-of-the-way rural children, 
stipulated for the provision of social services to students in rural school districts.71  These 
projects highlight the still keen awareness of varying citizen needs at the county level, 
recognizing the universal needs of work for unemployed unskilled, professional and 
female laborers while understanding that residents of rural and urban communities each 
face different daily problems than the other.   
Additional projects, designed by the individual municipalities in which they 
functioned, highlight the benefit of the WPA’s flexibility on the local level to allow town 
supervisors to sponsor projects distinctively beneficial to their localities.72  Improvements 
made to the County Home Farm by the Town of Fonda and the construction of a hangar 
and administrative buildings at the Fort Plain Airfield epitomize uniquely rural projects 
enabled by the set up, with farm improvements only possible in municipalities where 
farming was possible and the construction of the hangar and administrative buildings 




72 Additional projects including, but not limited to fire lane construction, stone quarry operation, and 
gravel-crushing plants are also representative of the phenomenon. Ibid. 
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serving to increase Fort Plain’s connection to larger communities.73  On the flipside, the 
arrangement also enabled more urban centers like Amsterdam to engage in projects 
specific to their own needs.  On September 4th 1935, Amsterdam’s Mayor Carter swayed 
the city Common Council to approve the submission of a project application to the WPA 
requesting funds for the construction of both a new water filtration plant and new 
incinerator complex.74  While it is unclear whether or not these projects were ever 
approved or completed, the freedom to draft and apply for such facilities testifies to the 
manner in which the malleable sponsorship procedures of the WPA benefitted mixed 
rural/urban regions like upstate New York.75   
Throughout the rest of upstate New York, projects proceeded in much the same 
manner as occurred in Montgomery County.  A large amount of work done in rural New 
York communities during the fall of 1935 was designed by those municipalities in 
response to severe flooding during summer flooding during July of 1935.  Efforts in 
Broome, Chenango, Cortland, Delaware, Otsego, Sullivan, Tioga, and Tompkins 
Counties, District 8 of the upstate New York WPA, focused on flood abetment and 
prevention in order to ensure the viability of vital farm-to-market roads closed after the 
floods of 1935.76  The maintenance and protection of farm-to-market roads was of 
paramount importance for these western counties, with agricultural production 
accounting for the majority share of the region’s economic output.  A large supplier of 
milk and dairy products for major northeastern cities, the combined fluid milk output of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid. 
74 “Mayor Gets Authority To Ask Government Grants For Filtration and Incinerator,” The Amsterdam 
Evening Recorder, Sept 4, 1935. 
75 This early ambition in city-specific projects was not limited to Montgomery County, Schenectady, NY 
proposed to the WPA a low-cost housing project to provide shelter to the city’s working poor.  “Fate of 
City Housing Project Yet In Dark,” The Schenectady Gazette, September 21, 1935. Pg. 14.  
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District 8 totaled 1,984,479,000 pounds in 1934.77  To protect the lines of transit for milk 
shipments the counties in the district prepared projects for creek bed clearance, 
construction of new banks and dikes and reforestation.78   In Ontario County, by late 
November between 300 and 400 men were engaged in projects ranging from roadwork 
on farm-to-market highways such as the Phelps-Mott, Hopewell-Curran and Smith-Wass 
roads, to waterproofing and lining at the Phelps Reservoir, facilities improvements at 
Kershaw Park and expansion of fencing at State farm located within the county.79 In 
Montgomery, Schoharie and Ontario counties a statewide project for the control of 
malaria allocated funds to fill in swamps and manage wetlands in order to completely 
eradicate the disease in the region.80   
Beyond manual labor, the state and its municipalities devised a large number of 
projects designed to supply employment opportunities for women and white-collar 
workers.  By the mid-1930’s approximately 11% of individuals on relief in upstate New 
York belonged to the professional class.81  As such, in a similar manner to construction 
and infrastructural projects, professional projects both created work for a particular 
unemployed population and utilized the skills of that population for the general 
betterment of the region. Across New York, state and county projects provided projects 
in the fields of education, clerical work, nursing and recreation.  On August 26th the New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 “Dibble Pledges Full Relief for Workers: ‘Big Skeeter’ Fund,” The Canandaigua Daily Messenger, 
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York State WPA announced a new $4,495,089 program of adult education for the state.  
Employment was provided for thousands of teachers and recreational workers, and 
classes were conducted in literacy for “illiterates and foreign born adults,” “commerce, 
industry, technical work, art, agriculture and home making, general cultural subjects and 
hobbies.”82  In addition to adult education classes, at least 25 towns and cities throughout 
the state provided “emergency nursery schools” for the continuation of student education 
as well as for the disbursement of social services to attending children in areas where 
these essential amenities were unavailable or rare as a result of the Depression.83  The 
WPA also employed 600 relief-eligible graduate and registered nurses in a state wide 
nursing program, active across all upstate counties.  The program provided aid for 
450,000 families in New York, offering healthcare to “800,000 children under 16 years of 
age, bedside nursing of the unemployed sick in almost half a million families, health 
supervision to prevent sickness,” and prenatal care for expecting mothers.  The work 
conducted under these programs again testifies to the exhaustive quality of the early 
WPA in the upstate New York region.84   
By December of 1935 the trend of upstate Works Progress Administration 
activities was overwhelmingly positive.  According to WPA publications, during the first 
half of November the number of active projects and employees in District 8 jumped by 	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46 projects and 1,202 persons, from 70 and 1,700 at the beginning of the month, and to 
116 and 2,902 by its midpoint.85  On November 12th, the upstate New York WPA 
announced that as of November 2nd a total of 33,445 individuals employed by the works 
program upstate, compared to 223,125 employed in New York City and a total 1,007,208 
employed nationwide.86  As of December 15th, virtually all employable individuals on 
relief rolls in upstate New York had been removed and were engaged by WPA work 
projects, with 169 projects in operation and 3,843 individuals on the books.87 In 
Montgomery County, outside of the city of Amsterdam, between September and October 
of 1935, 116 relief clients were taken off of rolls and added to WPA projects.  Further, in 
February of 1935 a total of 562 residents of Montgomery County (outside of the city of 
Amsterdam), received home relief and/or work relief.  Following two months of steady 
WPA employment in September and October, home relief cases declined by almost 50%, 
to just 306 cases as individuals left relief rolls in part for jobs on the WPA.88  Though 
some critics of the WPA have claimed that, even during this period, the program never 
employed enough people, it remains that those certified as employable for the purposes of 
WPA work were indeed employed with the WPA in these instances. From the 
information that is available, it is evident that, as the organization itself stated in 
retrospect in 1936 regarding its activity in District 8, during 1935 the Works Progress 
Administration in upstate New York “moved swiftly toward the accomplishment of its 
purpose.”89 
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Despite this apparent success, however, by the end of 1935 a number of problems 
small and large still existed in aspects of the upstate relief structure.  Perhaps the largest 
of these problems was significant disconnect between perceived and actual regional 
project-related needs as conceived by federal administrators.  For instance, as previously 
mentioned the Federal government drafted and approved a statewide malaria and 
mosquito eradication project designed to remove the disease from upstate New York.  
However, according to relief administrators in several of the communities who received 
funding for anti-malaria projects, malaria had never been a problem in their areas.  
District health officer of the State Department of Health Dr. James S. Walton of 
Amsterdam informed reporters of the Schenectady Gazette during November of 1935 that 
there was “no necessity for such a program in Montgomery County” as in the few years 
before the projects there had been “only a few cases” of malaria known in the region, and 
none considered to be out of the ordinary.90 In fact, The Otsego Farmer from 
Cooperstown New York reported that no officials in either Montgomery or Schoharie 
County were aware of any presence of malaria bearing mosquitoes in either county.91 
What’s more, these disbursements were often made without consultation of local 
authorities previous to their approval.  In Montgomery County, Dr. Walton was quoted at 
stating that he personally had no knowledge of a grant having been made for malaria 
control, and “as far as he knew,” one had not been requested by a local sponsor.”92  In 
both cases, those federal employees who drafted the project were out of touch with on-
the-ground conditions regarding malaria, and created a project of little to no value for 
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many of the areas it touched.  While the cases in Montgomery and Schoharie counties are 
not enough to prove widespread misjudgment of local needs in the Federal government, it 
is important to understand the problem did exist. 
Beyond simply creating ineffective projects, conflict between the federal 
government and state/local institutions also had the capacity to create bureaucratic 
gridlock within the state’s relief structure.  Disputes between the federal government and 
existing departments of the New York state government resulted in occasional roadblocks 
for projects in the state.  In one instance, disagreement over wage rates for educators in 
WPA emergency nursery schools resulted in the December 26th shut down of WPA 
schools and parent education classes in twenty-five cities throughout the state.93  For six 
months prior to the shut down, negotiations between the State Department of Education 
and the WPA attempted to establish a compromise between the high prevailing wage for 
New York teachers and greatly reduced wage advocated by Works Progress 
Administration officials.  Under the WPA, potential educators would make 50% below 
average pay rates offered to New York teachers in periods of normal economic activity.94  
Further, the wage rate arranged under the WPA was even 25% lower than the lawful 
minimum wage required for rural elementary school teachers, the lowest paid in the 
state.95 Assistant Commissioner for Elementary Education Dr. J. Cayce Morrison 
articulated the state’s case against the WPA rates, arguing that the salary level fixed by 
the WPA for supervisors were far too low for the hiring of adequate staff.96 However the 
WPA would not budge and alleged that it would run the schools entirely independently if 
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the state would not comply.  As state institutions like the Department of Education took 
time to adjust to WPA presence throughout 1936, clashing ideologies ensured at least 
some level of friction as a result of the WPA’s new and different policies. 
Beyond these larger administrative and oversight related issues, a series of smaller 
problems also met the upstate WPA in its first months.  First, protests over wage rates 
and hiring practices signaled that not all unemployed or relief-receiving individuals were 
taken care of or satisfied by the WPA.  In mid-December, in Catskill, NY, WPA 
employees planned a protest in response to an administration ruling stating that “only 
men on relief from May to November” were eligible for WPA jobs.  The men, who in 
their own words had “toiled hard for five years to stay off of federal relief and to keep 
self respect,” as a result of the ruling were to lose employment with the Works Progress 
Administration for the immediate future.  As a result, the workers resolved to 
demonstrate against a decision that they interpreted as a failing on the part of the 
government to respect their ill-fated attempts at earning an honest living.97  On December 
3rd, representatives of organized labor in upstate New York held a 75-delegate conference 
to seek a statewide strike of all WPA projects unless demands for an assured prevailing 
wage (as opposed to a security wage) were met or unless a meeting was secured on the 
matter with New York State Governor Lehman and President Roosevelt.98  The resulting 
strike lasted seven weeks between December of 1935 and January of 1936, resulting in 
declared but uncertain victory for those skilled workers agitating for explicitly defined 
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prevailing wages.99    These issues show a larger disjunction between those upstate 
workers eligible for work with the WPA and the larger body of unemployed individuals. 
These issues were supplemented by inter-county disputes over contributions 
towards particular programs and disagreements over the viability of the new relief set up.  
In Ontario County, two separate conflicts over relief spending drove a wedge between 
members of that county’s Board of Supervisors.  The first conflict developed out of an 
August 15th dispute over a potential $6,000 bond issue to fund the completion of 
completion of a particular park program under the WPA.100  The second quarrel arose 
from a November 21st disagreement over the creation of a $3,500 fund for the 
establishment of a county 4-H Department summer camp not located within the 
county.101 In each instance the proposed project created substantial rifts between Board of 
Supervisor members in that county as a result of ideological differences regarding the 
appropriateness of funding non-infrastructural programs under a work-relief program.   
In spite of the swift achievements accomplished by the WPA between August and 
December of 1935, it is evident that some community leaders still had serious doubts 
about the ability of the WPA to successfully accomplish its self-professed goal of 
eliminating work relief as a local responsibility.102  Writing in November of 1935, the 
Board of Supervisors of Montgomery County clearly had, even after several months of 
WPA work, substantial reservations about the capability of the organization to lift the 
burden of relief from the shoulders of local governmental structures.  In fact, some 	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individuals worried what might happen should the WPA fail to employ as many 
unemployed individuals as formerly done on work relief projects.  If this was the case, 
many individuals predicted that the program would then increase the burden on 
communities by raising the amount of home relief cases within their boundaries.103  
Among county officials, concern mounted over the potential negative effects of relief on 
families and their children. In particular, fears of the capacity for “prolonged idleness” 
and “made work” to ruin work habits and “destroy health and initiative” fueled 
skepticism towards the new relief structure. These issues considered, it is no surprise that 
county leaders feared the possible short and long-term social and financial implications of 
a decrease in work-relief and increase in home-relief, should the WPA fail to engage at 
least as many workers as had previously been employed.104  By the end of 1935, the 
WPA’s flexible sponsorship structure and direct federal funding enabled ample 
adjustment of work projects across the varied landscape of upstate New York.  While 
doubts regarding the ability of the program still lingered in the minds of supervisors and 
administrators in some regions of the state as a result of bureaucratic deadlock and 
complete federal control over wages and budgetary concerns, the first year of the WPA 
set the stage for an explosion of new projects and reduction of relief rolls in 1936.
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Chapter 4: The Rise and Fall of the WPA in Upstate New York, 1936-1943 
By June 30th of 1943, the United States little resembled the nation it had been at 
onset of the Great Depression.  Twelve and a half years on from Black Tuesday and the 
stock market crash that heralded the start of hard times, neither the the military, nor the 
political landscape, nor the economic situation of the United States bore even a passing 
resemblance the Pre-Depression U.S.  The once-staunchly isolationist the United States 
in June of 1943 was less than two weeks away from the commencement of “Operation 
Husky,” a full scale Allied invasion of the island of Sicily and Southern Italy.  After a 
year and a half of war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, U.S. troops started the long 
march north towards Germany and Berlin that would help lead to the European war’s 
culmination two years later with the surrender of Berlin in the spring of 1945.  On the 
home front, in little over a year the United States would elect to an unprecedented fourth 
term the man who had served as its Commander in Chief since 1933, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt— a man who during his time in office expanded the size, economic role and 
power of the federal government in ways that could at the start of his presidency never 
had been conceived of by most mainstream politicians and citizens.  However, the most 
noteworthy event of that early summer day in 1943 pertained not to the U.S. global 
presence or its President but to that President’s program which since had 1935 
revolutionized relief and placed new public works in every American community.  On 
June 30th, 1943, the Works Progress Administration closed its doors.1  Expending 
approximately $13,000,000,000 between August 1935 and June 1943, the WPA 	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employed over 8,500,000 workers nationally.2  In its era, the WPA create and 
rehabilitated countless miles of roadways throughout the nation, served over one billion 
school lunches to children of destitute families, and among other projects drained over 
15,000 miles of malarial land.  But on June 30th, all of these works came to an end.   The 
WPA received, as President Roosevelt phrased it, the “honorable discharge” which it had 
earned.3   
 In upstate New York, the record of the Works Progress Administration by 1943 
represented a state-level microcosm of those successes accomplished by the program 
nationally. From 1936 to the program’s demise in 1943, administrators of New York’s 
WPA built heavily on what had been accomplished by the program between August and 
December of 1935.  During this period, New York State, its counties and municipalities 
developed projects tailored to the disparate occupational and communal needs of upstate 
cities and municipalities first addressed by the program in 1935. Flush with heavy 
appropriations from large relief spending bills passed through Congress in 1936, 1937 
and to an extent 1938 the WPA was able to adequately lift the bulk of work relief 
expenditures from the shoulders of municipal accounts and place them on the back of the 
federal system.  Despite the constant presence of internal and external difficulties that 
often frustrated the WPA’s progress, prior to 1939 the administration was largely able to 
accomplish its primary economic objectives.  
However, by late 1938 and 1939, sustained cuts to the WPA’s operating budget, 
fundamental alterations to the program’s guiding regulations, and rising politicization of 
the relief program resulted in slowly increasing local welfare costs and increased unrest 	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among upstate localities.  After a turbulent 1939 and early 1940, the rise of war industries 
in the state of New York catalyzed a rebirth of the WPA, reoriented the administration 
towards the accomplishment of largely defense-oriented initiatives.  Spurring the WPA 
along until mid 1943, the defense industries in upstate New York provided the WPA with 
a period of redemption before finally rendering the service unnecessary in by June of that 
year. Despite the disastrous effect of Federal cuts to the WPA through the late 1930’s, the 
program nevertheless left a legacy of unprecedented federal public investment that 
produced results still visible today.  
 As warm weather returned to upstate New York in the spring of 1936, cities, 
towns and counties resumed work on WPA projects put on hold when cold weather 
descended on the state in December of the previous year.  Large projects begun in 
September, October and November of 1935 were revived for the spring 1936 
construction season.  These projects provided the base of WPA work for the first half of 
the year, receiving new local and federal allocations.  Containing more detailed 
instructions than their 1935 predecessors, these works continued to solidify the principles 
of what constituted a worthy project.  For example, the East End Park project in 
Amsterdam, New York, evolved from simply "completion of athletic field" in 1935, to 
"Completion of athletic field, including construction of tennis courts, ball diamonds, 
running track and appurtenances on publicly owned property" in April of 
1936.4  Similarly, in 1935 the Amsterdam Municipal Golf Course received an initial 
appropriation of $51,742 and operated on the basic instruction to "construct municipal 
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golf course."5  In April of 1936 the initial appropriation grew by $20,000, and the project 
description evolved to include "Construction of 18 hole municipal golf course, located 
adjacent to the northerly boundary line of the city; 181.4 acres have been acquired by the 
city” for this purpose.6  Finally, in October of 1936 the official project description for the 
Municipal Golf Course advanced to read:  "Improve municipal golf course, construct 
parking space, tennis courts, rustic bridges, chain link fence, grass nursery, Improve 
creek, alter existing building for tool storage and remove old stone walls," receiving 
$48,600 in supplementary funds to accomplish the newly articulated goals.7  These 
projects not only continued and evolved initiatives started and halted in 1935, but also 
reaffirmed the idea that WPA projects should be of “the greatest use” to the communities 
in which they were conducted.   
Across the state, the pattern displayed in Amsterdam presented itself through the 
continuation of projects that not only accommodated the specific needs of their host 
communities, but also advanced along the program’s developmental trajectory 
established by the projects approved in 1935.  Expenditures within first six months of 
1936 fell overwhelmingly on desperately needed projects updating local infrastructures 
across upstate New York.   Allocations for roadwork included both repairs to city streets 
like those in Amsterdam which received additional funds to continue to widen 
intersections and grade, curb, resurface and pave portions of the city’s downtown area; 
and for repair on rural routes like County roads #75-2 and #103 outside the towns of 
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Florida and Fonda.8  Similarly, sanitary work and flood control projects received 
additional funding to continue work on critical infrastructural projects unable to be 
pursued through the winter. In this vein, projects constructing new water supplies, water 
lines and sewer systems as well as deepening flood-prone creeks within the villages of 
Palatine, Canajoharie and St. Johnsville were revived in April of 1936.9  Funds were also 
furnished for the maintenance of sewing rooms established in 1935 as well as for the 
continuation of nursery school operations and surveys for tax assessment purposes in 
Canajoharie and Amsterdam.10  With infrastructural projects providing work for manual 
laborers and white-collar projects supplying out of work professionals with employment, 
the projects continued in early 1936 laid the blueprint for the direction that the WPA 
would travel as moved forward. 
The work undertaken in New York State in 1936 composed a loose catalogue of 
project types and project goals which in large part governed the approval of funds for 
proposed works through the better portion of the Administration’s formative years.  
Apparent in both volume of projects and size of disbursements, infrastructural 
improvements to the roads, bridges, sewage, water delivery systems and flood control 
arrangements in urban and rural communities throughout the state comprised the bulk of 
work conducted in New York.  Outdated and outmoded roadways both inside and outside 
village spaces received considerable attention through 1936.  City streets, like Bird Road 
in the Town of Manchester in Ontario County, were widened graded, curbed, resurfaced 
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and paved to ensure easier, smoother travel through town.11  In some communities, like 
St. Johnsville in western Montgomery County, municipal street improvements of this 
kind were pursued with such vigor that by the end of 1937, virtually 100% of village 
streets were paved with new macadam topping.12  In the state’s rural expanses the 
improvement of farm-to-market trunk ways solidified itself as a chief concern for most 
upstate communities.  Highways of this kind, often seasonal at best up to this point, were 
grubbed, widened, ditched, resurfaced, and in many cases completely re-routed to reduce 
dangerous curves and steep grades as well as to ensure year-round accessibility.13  In 
Greene County, a largely rural region of New York with no cities and only a single 
incorporated village, by mid-1936 enjoyed 39 miles of new farm-to-market thoroughfares 
were constructed and 115 miles rebuilt.14  In Schoharie County, a region referred to by 
WPA administrators as a “wild and exceedingly rough expanse,” 44.1 miles of new roads 
were constructed by the mid-point of 1936.15  In the Town of Maryland, Crumhorn Road, 
a rural school bus route impassable in the winter and spring, was improved for all season 
use.16  These projects were so beloved by local residents that at times citizen groups 
banded together to sponsor the projects on their own dime.  For example, in Parksville in 
Sullivan County, citizens banded together to raise monies to put up the sponsor share and 
right of way costs for the Parksville-Cooley road, a route meant to “open a large country 
region heretofore inaccessible much of the year.”  The residents of the town organized a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “Bird Road Widening as Project Approved,” The Canandaigua Daily Messenger, February 25, 1936. 
12 “Parking Lot Work Started,” The St. Johnsville Enterprise, November 10, 1937 
13 Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16Ibid; Lester Herzog, WPA In The Susquehanna Country, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 
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town dance in order to raise these funds, gathering $1,140 in total.17  All across the state, 
roads formerly plagued by wagon tracks, winding paths up and down steep hills, deep 
gullies, boulders and “old fashioned ‘turn-outs’ popular 50 years prior” to the WPA’s 
work were replaced by modern roadways that, according to WPA reports circulated in the 
summer of 1936, created an “estimable boon to farmers and dairymen.”18   
Ranking near equal in popularity to roadwork, water network and sanitation 
projects were identified as chief objectives of upstate community leaders through the 
volume of projects approved dedicated to the modernization of such systems.  By the late 
1930’s a significant number of upstate municipalities lagged behind the capabilities of 
modern technologies in the areas of water delivery and sanitation.  As a result these 
projects flooded communities across the region and by mid-1936 came to represent a 
considerable proportion of the total workload of the upstate WPA.  In relatively rural 
locales like Palatine Bridge, prior to the WPA, some villages still lacked adequate in-
home water supplies.  To remedy this, Palatine Bridge sponsored a project constructing a 
new water supply for the township, installing a 300,000 gallon covered concrete reservoir 
complete with pump house and new pipe lines to the village.19    This new water supply 
enabled the city to for the first time provide its residents with adequate fire protection and 
home service.  In cities like Oneonta where water sources had already been long 
established, water provision was improved through the addition of supplementary 
spillways to reservoirs already in operation.20  The Albany WPA erected what became the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “Construction Underway On Farm-To-Market Road,” Middletown Times Herald, September 14, 1936. 
18 For additional information on farm-to-market roads, see Appendix II.   
19 Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936); 
Microfilm, “Works Progress Administration Central Office Starting Target, Reel 10, Reference Card 
Location Project File E.R.A. Acts 1935-1938,” FDRL.   
20 Lester Herzog, WPA In The Susquehanna Country, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936). 
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crown jewel of reservoir projects in the region.  The “Basin C Albany Water Works 
System,” the completion of a trinity of storage reservoirs just outside Loudonville, 
provided the city with a maximum 93,000,000 gallons of water, greatly enhanced the 
water delivery capabilities of the city and ensured a satisfactory water supply for city 
residents through the 21st century.21  These water delivery projects were accompanied by 
upgrades to the region’s aging sanitary systems, and in large municipalities like 
Amsterdam, Cortland, Delmar, Troy as well as in rural communities including Catskill, 
Cairo, Athens and Hagaman, new sanitary and storm sewers were installed town-wide.22 
Established industrial centers like Binghamton simply sought to prevent rainwater refuse 
from becoming a public health menace, and up-and-coming municipalities like Kingston 
installed storm sewers and pump stations in order to open land for new residential 
development.23   
Outside of these major infrastructural projects, the WPA moved its agenda in the 
direction of more general community development.  Despite federal restrictions on the 
Administration’s potential involvement in non-public endeavors, enterprising townships 
devised ways to increase the economic viability of their municipalities and to attract 
business and employment opportunities to their areas.  In the village of St. Johnsville, 
community leaders given a portion of the old Union Mills building by town resident 
Joseph H. Reaney, separated the newly public portion of the mill from the still private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Upgrades to the reservoir did not occur until 2013.  Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New 
York: Works Progress Administration, 1936);  Rick Karlin, Dam Safety Program Advocated,” The Albany 
Times Union Online. April 11, 2013. 
22 Lester Herzog, WPA In The Susquehanna Country, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936); 
Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936);  “WPA 
Project In Watershed.”  The St. Johnsville Enterprise. January 8th, 1936. 
23 Lester Herzog, WPA In The Susquehanna Country, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936); 
Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936). 
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segment with a brick wall erected by the WPA in January of 1936.24  In May, the town 
then used WPA funds to renovate the building into a space attractive to potential 
manufacturing operations, and in 1937 rented the public space to a private dress 
manufacturer, employing over 44 men on WPA work and bringing 200 new jobs to the 
village, according to local sources.25  In Kingston, Ulster County, town authorities 
advanced a WPA project resulting in the construction of a three-story brick Pathological 
Laboratory located on the grounds of the Kingston Hospital.  The laboratory served all 
hospitals and health departments in the city of Kingston and generated new science-
related jobs in the community and potentially provided employment for WPA registered 
nurses.26   
Apart more economically driven operations, cities and villages across the state 
sponsored a large number of projects aimed simply at improving the aesthetics of their 
towns, providing increased entertainment and recreation opportunities for their residents. 
All sizes of townships engaged in the rehabilitation of public properties including 
firehouses, city halls, schools, sports complexes and even public parks.  In the large city 
of Albany, renovations were made to the Capitol Building, the Governor’s Mansion, the 
State Education Building, and even to public health facilities like the Hall Mansion 
Solarium for the rehabilitation of undernourished children and the Albany public baths 
whose facilities were used to help offer therapy to paralytic individuals according to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “Local Briefs,” The St. Johnsville Enterprise.  January 8th, 1936;] 
25 “WPA To Make Improvements In Local Mill,” The St. Johnsville Enterprise.  May 6th, 1936;  “WPA 
Approves Projects Here,” The St. Johnsville Enterprise.  January 13th, 1937. 
26 Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936); Lester 
Herzog, The WPA in Massena. (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936); Microfilm, “Works 
Progress Administration Central Office Starting Target, Reel 10, Reference Card Location Project File 
E.R.A. Acts 1935-1938,” FDRL Beyond these instances of economic improvement, in Fonda authorities 
submitted and received approval on an application for the creation of a reinforced concrete shop to provide 
workspace for barge canal employees, and in Fort Plain and Massena air fields were developed and 
improved in order to encourage business travel in and out of the communities.   
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same methods practiced in Warm Springs for President Roosevelt.27  In the rural 
townships of Middleburgh and Sharon Springs, the WPA constructed athletic facilities 
surrounding the communities’ public schools, and in Fort Plain the WPA erected a 
bandstand in the center of town for the hosting of public concerts and entertainment 
events.28   
In order to protect the new developments of the WPA and defend municipalities 
against regular destruction, flood control cemented itself as a major project priority 
following intense statewide flooding during the summer of 1935 and the spring of 1936. 
In locations ranging from tiny Dolgeville to the whole of New York WPA District 8, 
floodwalls were erected, streambeds cleared, new banks and dikes constructed, and 
reforestation efforts undertaken in order to mitigate any future damage from episodes of 
severe rainfall.29  By 1936 flood control had become such a hallmark of the upstate WPA, 
that when President Roosevelt toured central New York in August of that year, he 
enlisted future Administration Director Col. F.C. Harrington to ensure arrangements were 
made to visit WPA flood control projects throughout the region.30 
Beyond projects for unskilled laborers, the program in upstate New York moved 
through 1936 in the direction of increased and diversified professional projects for the 
employment of formerly white-collar individuals. According to administration figures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936); 
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File E.R.A. Acts 1935-1938,”  FDRL; “WPA Approves Projects Here,” The St. Johnsville Enterprise.  
January 13th, 1937. 
28 Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936); 
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29 “New WPA Wall In Dolgeville,” The St. Johnsville Enterprise.  June 6, 1937; Lester Herzog, WPA In 
The Susquehanna Country. (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936); 
30 Telephone conversation, Col. Harrington to Mr. Herzog, 8/10/1936, Box 76, Folder: “FERA-WPA 
Transcripts of Telephone Conversations with State Relief Directors and Other Officials, 1934-1938, New 
York—North Dakota,” Hopkins Collection, FDRL. 
30 Ibid.  
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published in 1936, by midway through the WPA’s second year approximately 11% of 
individuals occupying relief rolls in upstate New York carried with them backgrounds in 
“expensively acquired skills” in non-physical works including engineering, dentistry, 
library sciences and many other professional-class vocations.31 Operating on this 
information and under the belief that it was “economically unsound and socially 
undesirable” to place professionals on working class projects, lest their carefully learned 
skills and morale disintegrate, the New York State WPA established a statewide network 
of projects oriented around utilizing white collar abilities and talents.32 The “Emergency 
Adult Education Program,” furnished with $4,000,000 in early 1936, by mid-year 
employed 3,150 teachers, recreation leaders and assistants in a variety of educational 
positions throughout the state.  The program offered a diverse catalogue of classes for 
working-class individuals still unemployed as a result of the depression.  Courses 
included literacy modules,  “bread and butter courses” in the economic, sociological and 
political troubles of the era, worker classes in Utica, Syracuse, and Rochester designed to 
educate affected parties on the socio-economic forces of the depression, vocational 
training in skills attractive to potential employers, and even “Emergency Collegiate 
Centers” for young people unemployed and who could not afford college tuition.33  
Educators were pulled exclusively from relief rolls, were not required to have a teacher 
certification degree, and earned wages according to local WPA pay scales. In all, between 
its separate programs for vocational education, adult education, worker’s education, 
education for the physically handicapped and Emergency Collegiate Centers, the 
Emergency Adult Education program served in 1936 upwards of 40,000 students each 	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32 Lester Herzog, Women's and Professional Projects, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936). 
33 Emergency Adult Education Program statistics for summer 1936: See Appendix III. 
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day.  In addition to its Emergency Adult Education Program, the state furnished 
employment for professional workers in nursing and teaching positions in its “State 
Education Department Nursery Schools;” in office and clerical positions conducting 
historical records surveys, tax surveys, and as stenographers, filing clerks, and 
secretaries; as musicians in Federal Music Program sponsored orchestras and bands, and 
even in 123 sewing-room projects throughout the state.34  By the summer of 1936, the 
New York State WPA employed approximately 16,000 individuals on over 735 
professional projects throughout the state.35  In these professional pursuits as well as the 
state’s established devotion to infrastructural projects, it is evident that the over the 
course of 1936 the upstate Works Progress Administration expanded outward from its 
roots planted in 1935, and matured into a program entrenched in specialized labor 
pursuits tailored to the region’s occupational and communal demands.36   
The growth of the WPA over 1936 did not occur without complication.  
Throughout the year, political disputes within the WPA’s administrative structure caused 
hiccups in the otherwise smooth development of WPA projects.  As early as January, 
political posturing from groups not aligned with the Roosevelt Administration challenged 
the state and federal approach to relief in areas under their control.  On January 13th, 300 
white-collar WPA workers in Buffalo were released from city work sites as a result of 
their physical inability to adequately serve as foremen on construction projects.  
Following these dismissals, a Buffalo area political boss by the name of Carr, a Democrat 
not affiliated with the administration, contacted Harry Hopkins in an effort to reverse the 
dismissals.  Further, Carr desired to secure for Buffalo an administrative set up 	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35 Lester Herzog, Women's and Professional Projects, (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936) 
36 All education programs, nursing programs, and arts programs came into existence under the WPA.   
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completely independent of the state WPA, an arrangement similar to that which had been 
arranged for New York City.37  While the event did not result in any substantial changes 
to Buffalo’s relief arrangement, the occasion nevertheless forced the administration to 
meet with the aggrieved individual along with the members of Buffalo’s Common 
Council in an attempt to appease and settle the dissident parties.38  What’s more, when 
Hopkins and Region 1 Administrator Ray Branion realized that none of the individuals 
serving on the city council were political allies recognizable to WPA leaders in Albany, 
the pair made the decision to deal with a figure who was not part of the council as their 
point man on the issue. In this, the incident revealed a substantial disconnect between the 
federal WPA administration and non-Democrat, non-Roosevelt forces in control of 
regional WPA operations as well as potential disengagement between select federal and 
local WPA officials.39  Beyond this dispute, disagreements regarding statewide pay rates 
and hours between New York State Administrator Lester Herzog and WPA 
Commissioner Hopkins, as well as finger pointing between municipal, county and state 
officials regarding delayed paycheck delivery in Canandaigua, Elmira and White Plains 
resulted in confusion and provided evidence of at times sub-par communication and 
cooperation between federal, state, and local authorities.40   
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Along with administrative disputes, more diverse and localized difficulties 
plagued the upstate WPA throughout 1936.  In July, extreme drought afflicted much of 
western and central New York, regularly bringing temperatures in excess of 100 degrees 
Fahrenheit, and causing “upstate crops already damaged by drought” to wilt and wither 
away under the extreme temperatures.41  Farmers, unable to physically bear the heat were 
forced out of their fields, leaving crops and milk production (estimated to be reduced by 
50% as a result of the drought) "at a standstill or deteriorating" according to 
contemporary accounts from Cornell University.42  Supplementing the stress placed on 
the agricultural industry by the July drought, from August 31st to September 1st, milk 
strikes from farmers statewide protested the below-subsistence level pricing of milk sales 
in the state. 43  Despite work projects designed to aid in milk transport and the 
employment of farmers, the WPA had no mechanism for providing support for dairymen 
with pricing issues.44  As such, these strikes highlighted a side of the depression in rural 
New York that the WPA could not help.   
In addition to external issues, administrators with little knowledge about specific 
regional needs created significant distress for unemployed persons. For example, 
following the resignation of the WPA nurse for Oneida County, relief administrators 
refused to hire a new nurse to replace her despite desperate appeals from regional health 
professionals.  Further, these same administrators insisted that local children did not need 
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and should not receive WPA sponsored (and WPA nurse delivered) diphtheria 
vaccinations. This decision incensed local health officials who remained steadfast in the 
conviction that these vaccinations were critically important to child health in the 
county.45  In addendum to local concerns, specific groups were often left in the dark 
regarding their fate in relation to employment status on WPA payrolls.  Nowhere was this 
situation better defined than in the case of veteran enrollment in the summer of 1936.  As 
the delivery of bonus checks owed to veterans of the First World War loomed in June of 
1936, vets enrolled in the WPA were largely not informed as to changes in their relief 
status after checks were delivered.46   
As 1936 reached its close, the upstate WPA found itself in the midst of both 
fantastic growth and pointed criticism.  As evidenced by a number of syndicated 
newspaper editorials selected for inclusion in regional papers throughout the state, 
individuals already pre-disposed to disagreement with state-sponsored relief in general 
disparaged the WPA's structure and its workers.47  Detractors asserted that WPA workers 
were both lazy and greedy, while the program itself was wasteful and only enabled 
worker’s negative attributes.48  It was even asserted in some communities that WPA 
employment had actually caused acute labor shortages in sections of the state, with the St. 
Johnsville Enterprise publishing such a claim on Armistice Day of 1936.  However, 
despite the presence of problems in each section of the New York, these problems were 
not universal across the state.  Further, they in no way hindered the ability of the WPA to 
carry out its most basic economic goal, that is, putting people to work on useful projects 	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in a manner which would lift the primary burden of work relief off of the community and 
place it on the federal relief structure.   
By the end of 1936, the New York Works Progress Administration created a 
network of diverse projects across the state that accommodated the unique needs of 
sharply varying communities and populations. Beyond this, the work of the WPA also 
produced results that suggested substantial gains towards the Administration's desired 
economic ends. By halfway through 1936, across the nation the WPA had met the 
employment goals set by federal administrators at the program’s outset.49 The massive 
spending policies of the New Deal had, by 1936, resulted in a steady economic growth 
and continued decline in unemployment, falling to under 17% from its 1933 high of 
24.9%.50  This economic progress worked with WPA employment to create a better 
living situation for unemployed populations across upstate New York. 
Reports from the Montgomery County Board of Supervisors on the relief situation 
in that county at the end of 1936 suggested substantial improvement of the relief situation 
by the end of the 1936 fiscal year.  Following a peak of 378 cases in January, 
simultaneous to the county's lowest recorded period of WPA employment during that 
year, by August of 1936 all employable members of families receiving home relief in 
Montgomery County were employed on either PWA or WPA jobs.51  Through September 
a total of 285 workers in Montgomery County were removed from relief rolls as a result 
of WPA (and to a small extent Public Works Administration) employment.  This increase 
in Works Progress Administration employment reduced the number of individuals on 
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home relief in the county to a meager 152 cases outside of Amsterdam from 350 at the 
same time the year before and 699 in February of 1934.52  In Frankfort, New York, at an 
April 10th meeting providing elaboration from state officials regarding the role of the 
WPA in the upstate region, representatives from the state administration praised the 
community for its outstanding efficiency in the disbursement of WPA relief to its needy 
population.53  After lauding Frankfort, State Administrator Lester Herzog and state 
supervisor of personnel for the WPA Charles D. O'Neal proclaimed that approximately 
90% of all employable persons on relief rolls in central New York by April of 1936 had 
been transitioned to work on WPA projects, thus lifting the bulk of potential work relief 
expenditures off of regional communities.54  Even indirect employment, an area which 
Director Hopkins explicitly stated there would be no conscious push towards, gained as a 
result of the WPA’s demand for materials.  In the first six months of 1936 approximately 
$38,500 went towards the purchase of materials for projects in Schenectady, with 137 
vendors benefiting from increased demand.55 In all, economic indicators depicted healthy 
growth and significant achievement for the upstate WPA through 1936.  Fueled by the 
highest national relief appropriation of the WPA’s up to that point, the nationally the 
WPA provided 3,036,000 jobs for the unemployed, a number not paralleled for the rest of 
the administration’s operation.56 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid; “Report of Montgomery County Home Relief,” in Proceedings of The Board of Supervisors of 
Montgomery County, 1935 (Fonda, New York: 1935). 132 
53 “WPA Official Lauds Set-Up at Frankfort,” The Utica Observer, April 10th, 1936. 
54 Ibid. 
55 “$77,000 Paid Out by City to Buy Materials,” The Schenectady Gazette, June 26th, 1936. 
56 Particular criticisms regarding projects not considered  “worthwhile” were answered in 1936.  In 
particular, Administrators fired back at remarks directed towards swamp drainage and malarial control 
projects, stating “Those persons with the abnormal sense of sarcasm who snickered loudly at swamp 
drainage projects and ‘mosquito control’ should have seen it,” in reference to the situation before swamp 
drainage had been done. Lester W. Herzog, WPA In The Susquehanna Country. (New York: Works 
Progress Administration, 1936). 
	   111	  
But even as the WPA expanded across upstate New York through 1936, a trend of 
layoffs and administrative cutbacks was to soon follow.  As a result of the program’s 
national success and the positive economic growth that persisted through the first half of 
1936, President Roosevelt was subjected to increasingly heavy pressure to reduce deficit 
spending in accordance with the disappearance of those conditions that had originally 
warranted it.  The President outlined in early summer an agenda of national cutbacks to 
the WPA meant to eventually reduce the program’s work by 25%.  Starting in June, 
national WPA payrolls began to decrease substantially, down from 3,036,000 at the end 
of February to 2,268,542 on June 20th, the lowest level of enrollment since November of 
1935.57  In July, the president reduced the WPA’s operating budget by a total of 25%.  On 
August 25th, in a conversation to New York State Administrator Lester W. Herzog, 
Deputy National Director Aubrey Williams disclosed to Herzog orders from President 
Roosevelt to slash New York State expenditure by approximately $1,000,000 through the 
end of the year and into 1937.58 Furthermore, the president demanded that New York 
reduce its administrative overhead costs to a level Herzog believed simply impossible to 
attain.59   
Continuing the downward direction begun over the summer, on September 1st the 
federal WPA began an even deeper retrenchment program designed to cut WPA payrolls 
by 175,000 persons nationally.60  Further curtailment of WPA works occurred in late 
October as a result of the coming winter.  Seasonal shutdowns forced many workers 	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60 The target reduction, in monetary terms, was articulated to be a cut of $65,000,000, placing the budget at 
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across upstate back onto home relief.  In Binghamton alone this resulted in the placement 
of 125 former WPA employees back on relief rolls.61  In early December, WPA officials 
in Washington announced an intended 33 per cent reduction in federal relief costs for 
1937.62  This reduction added to September’s retrenchment goals through the release of 
250,0000 WPA workers receiving employment as a result of drought conditions over the 
month of December.63  The final goal of these cuts would be the reduction of national 
WPA employment to 2,000,000 workers.64  In municipalities throughout the state these 
cuts to federal relief monies meant significant increases in county welfare costs.  Over the 
course of November, Ontario County in the Finger Lakes region of New York recorded a 
more than $4,000 increase in welfare costs over the amount expended the previous 
month, a 26% increase in relief spending.65  Asserting that the increase in costs came “in 
a large measure” as a result of the WPA’s summer and fall retrenchment measures, 
County Welfare Commissioner Harry K. Dibble and Chairman of the Ontario County 
Board of Supervisors Horace K. Seybolt noted that the WPA would not be accepting any 
new project applications until February 1st, when the WPA would announce its future 
plans.66  Further, individuals transferred to relief rolls from work project payrolls during 
the fall of 1936 would “not be reinstated for work on other WPA projects before 
February 1st at the earliest.”67  By mid December, New York had reduced the size of its 
WPA payroll to 96,900 persons, and administrators planned to reduce rolls further to 
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85,000 by mid January of 1937.68  On New Year’s Eve, 1936, the Canandaigua 
Messenger reported the elimination of Ontario County Manager of the WPA.  As a result 
of these sustained cutbacks, the roadblocks born from fiscal limitations overshadowed the 
memory of the administration’s accomplishments. 
It is crucial to note, however, that in cases of political crisis, limited increases in 
job allotments were in fact possible.  Take, for example, the occasion of the 1936 strike 
of Remington-Rand factory workers across upstate New York.  The strike itself occurred 
during November and December of 1936.  In sympathy with the striking workers a group 
of New York State Senators approached both Hopkins and Williams on the topic, placing 
heavy pressure on the pair to find WPA employment for all workers involved.  Bending 
to these senators in an attempt to remain in the good graces of upstate political forces, 
Williams enlisted Herzog to try to find jobs for the now out-of-work men.  Herzog and 
Williams contemplated maneuvering around restrictions in order to place the men (by and 
large individuals not certified for work with the WPA) on WPA jobs.  While the event 
never came to an end that explicitly broke rules in order to place non-certified, non-relief 
individuals on work projects as a political favor, it nevertheless exhibited the capability 
for political forces to maneuver WPA policy for better opportunities for their constituents 
in spite of broader state and national trends and policies.69  
Through the winter and early spring of 1937, the spirit of spending reductions 
only grew. Though work resumed starting in January on select projects across the state, 	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by March the national unemployment rate rose slightly after reaching a depression low of 
14%, perhaps the result of the retrenchment begun six months earlier.70  On April 10th the 
Roosevelt administration insisted on the absolute necessity of “substantial reductions in 
expenditure estimates” if the government held any hope of a balanced budget for 1938.71  
The President himself, following an April meeting with governors and other 
representatives from six states articulated his desire to further whittle down WPA rolls 
through 1937 and 1938.72  On May 14th, the Administration began a new retrenchment 
initiative intended to remove 525,000 WPA workers from rolls by 1938 in an attempt to 
make funds go further.  State WPA directors received instructions from Washington to 
compel communities to offer a larger portion of project costs moving forward through 
1937.  At the time of this announcement, National Director Hopkins warned Congress, 
certain elements of which demanded that the WPA receive only $1,000,000,000 in 1937, 
that “dropping 525,000 persons from WPA rolls would be successful only if private 
industry could hire those dismissed from government projects,” a warning which by late 
1937 would have a profound resonance for the President and Congressional leaders.73  As 
news spread about the proposed cuts, all but two of the nation’s Governors joined 
together in steadfast opposition to any substantial deviation from the nation’s 1936-1937 
$2,000,000,000 per year scale for work relief expenditures.  Why roll back the very 
measures that had catalyzed economic growth? However, inspired by bellwethers like 
declining unemployment, industrial output at near 1929 peak levels, and relatively 
increased farm income in July of 1937, President Roosevelt pushed through a 	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appropriations act which allocated $1.5 billion for all federal relief expenditures and 
stipulated an increase minimum sponsor shares from 9.8% to 20.8% by 1938.74  
The Relief Appropriation Act of 1937 had an almost immediate effect on upstate 
New York, as well as the nation as a whole.  Administrative personnel across the state 
were quickly stripped from WPA rolls. Nationwide cuts beginning in July cuts removed 
60,000 men and women from administrative positions with the WPA, with upstate cities 
like Syracuse seeing reductions occur as early as July 6th.75  The July 1937 cuts in many 
ways proved an extension of those started a year prior, in July of 1936. Like those 
cutbacks, the 1937 reduction was reported to come as the result of “improved business 
conditions.” As WPA workers moved to jobs in private industry, corresponding cuts were 
made to the program’s administrative staff in order to shrink it to a size appropriate for 
the smaller WPA workforce.76  Many county WPA offices across the state and country 
were closed as a result of the July cuts. While some, like that in Geneva, reopened shortly 
after initial diminutions were handed down, the bulk of those who shut their doors 
remained closed and shifted their case-load to state offices in Albany. 77  
Nationally, by the end of 1937 the positive industrial growth that had ushered in 
the 1937 appropriation legislation had begun to sour.  September brought with it sharp 
sell offs on the New York Stock Exchange; October, a 14 per cent drop in national 
industrial production.  As the year progressed and the economic decline begun in late 
summer worsened, the relapse became known publicly as “The Roosevelt Recession.”  
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As 1938 arrived, over two million Americans employed in private industry during the 
summer of 1937 found themselves once again out of work.78  
Despite the recession, through much of 1938 and even during the cuts of 1937 the 
work of the WPA in upstate New York maintained a steady rate of success.  In the state’s 
northwestern region, known as WPA Area Six, work conducted in Cayuga, Herkimer, 
Jefferson, Lewis, and Madison, Oneida, Oswego and St. Lawrence counties over the 
course of 1937 and 1938 typified that completed throughout the state in the same period.  
Between October of 1935 and October of 1938, approximately 751 projects were 
completed, released to and accepted by their sponsoring parties in Area Six.79 The 
physical accomplishments of these 751 projects provide further evidence for the heavy 
favoritism awarded to infrastructural projects in New York since the WPA’s founding.80  
In total, Area Six’s eight counties benefitted from 193 miles of new and improved 
roadways, 138.12 miles of new sanitary and storm sewer systems, 36.65 miles of water 
main pipes and even 312.68 acres of park space.81  Old favorites of WPA administrators 
endured through 1937 and 1938 alongside newer and at times more unique programs.  
Work continued on farm-to-market roads state-wide, with country roads like Town 
Routes #7, #8 and #21 receiving the excavation, grading, paving, shouldering, ditching 
and culverts of most modern roadways.82  Flood control efforts carried on in the North 
Country, with several cities in Area Six investing in creek straightening, riprapping, 
reconstruction of banks and dikes and the erection of new retaining walls to prevent 
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future flooding.83  At Stokes Reservoir in Oneida County, thirty-six miles of new water 
distribution lines were laid in order to bring adequate water supply and fire protection to 
communities throughout the county.84 Even fish hatcheries were constructed and opened 
in Rome, Van Hornesville and in Brownsville, showing a take on WPA development that 
perhaps reflected President Roosevelt’s own personal interest in conservation.  In 
addition to these physical projects, in the summer of 1938 the WPA Emergency Nursery 
School project was shut down for the months of July and August in order to reassess and 
reorganize the manner in which the program operated.85  The programs reopened in 
September newly streamlined, better organized and more cost-effective.  In all, the 
programs actual work conducted by the WPA in 1937 and 1938 proved highly 
comparable in both type and spirit as those that fostered relative success in 1935 and 
1936.86 
Through 1938, large sections of the state reported savings under the centrally 
organized Works Progress Administration when compared to the TERA/FERA set up in 
1934.  Brought to light in a report entitled “Comparison By Counties” issued by 
Administrator Herzog and compiled by the state WPA, the transition to a centralized 
relief structure under the WPA from the relatively independent and decentralized 
Emergency Work Bureaus of the TERA/FERA furnished upstate cities with enormous 
savings.  In Erie County and Buffalo, in April 1938 the WPA expended $201,847.44 less 
than local and community relief as administered by the regional EWB in October of 	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1934.87  Where the EWB’s of Buffalo city and Erie County employed a total 2,979 
employees, the combined Buffalo/Erie County WPA offices in 1938 accomplished the 
same work with only 70.88  Further, whereas Chautauqua, Genesee, Niagara, Orleans, 
Wyoming and Cattaraugus counties under the TERA/FERA each operated independent 
offices, under the WPA all six counties operated out of a single office, saving taxpayers a 
grand total of $59,621.10 per month.89  These provincial achievements point to a partial 
realization of the WPA’s original goals even during a period of sharp cutbacks.  
However, despite its regional successes, 1938 continued the decline of the Works 
Progress Administration.  Debate over the 1938 Congressional reauthorization of relief 
appropriations for the WPA as well as the rest of the federal relief structure began in May 
and, almost immediately, reductions took place.  The 1938 appropriation bill as drafted in 
the spring of that year disbursed only $1.25 for use on the WPA to furnish jobs a target 
quota of 2,800,000 jobs across the U.S. from July 1 1938 to February 1st 1939, a drop of 
$250,000,000 from 1937.90  It was during this debate that a key figure in the fate of the 
New York WPA emerged from the shadows to take a central role in federal relief issues.  
Representative John Taber, a Syracuse Republican representing New York’s 36th 
Congressional District and the ranking minority member of the House Appropriations 
Committee stepped to the plate during the 1938 reauthorization debates to voice his, and 
by extension, upstate Republican’s views of the Works Progress Administration.  Taber 
argued that the bill was “not a relief bill at all, but one for the construction of enormous 
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projects.”91  Expanding on this point, Taber continued to characterize the Works Progress 
Administration as a program of “wasteful” projects whose employment had 
“demoralizing effect” on individuals paid prevailing wages.92  Taber’s points make clear 
the antagonistic sentiment held by upstate Republican conservatives towards the work of 
the WPA, and predicted a push in the following year’s appropriation talks for the 
abolition of the prevailing wage.   
The remarks of Representative Taber were by no means the only negative 
sentiments articulated towards the Works Progress Administration in 1938.  Early on in 
February, town and county level community members involved with the WPA through 
the project application process delivered stern remarks to area newspapers regarding their 
recent interactions with the administration.  In February of 1938, Saratoga Springs Mayor 
Addison Mallory was appointed by the Saratoga City Council to represent the city in all 
matters involving the WPA.  Speaking candidly about the administration, Mayor Mallory 
disclosed to the Saratoga Springs Saratogian on February 15th that the WPA in Saratoga 
Springs and Glens Falls had been for two years a relatively “hit or miss affair.”  With 
relative impatience, Mallory continued in his statement to express a palpable frustration 
with the slow and inconsistent manner in which the administration had dealt with 
Saratoga, suggesting that he would be “camping at the WPA doorstep” in order to get 
done what the city had tasked him with doing.93  Elsewhere in the state, the WPA 
received more direct attacks on the program’s adequacy and on its record for adequately 
handling the unemployment crisis.  On February 12th of 1938, the New York State 
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Association of Public Welfare Officials issued a statement alleging that the WPA failed 
to fulfill its promise to provide work for all employables on home relief rolls.94  Further, 
the organization asserted that in order to make his administration look as if it was 
performing better than it actually was, Lester Herzog manipulated definitions of 
“employable” and “unemployable” when certifying home relief recipients for WPA 
work.  By marking employable individuals as unemployable, Herzog would be able to 
make it appear as if a larger percentage of the “employable” population was at work on 
WPA jobs than actually was.95  While it may be true that not all employables were able to 
be put on relief rolls in 1937 or 1938 (especially in the Capital District where despite 
incoming WPA jobs a total of 287 eligible individuals remained on home relief rolls in 
Schenectady), this failure was not the fault of the state administration.96  The WPA had 
plenty of jobs, periodically opening positions for home relief transfers to occupy.  For 
example on May 18th of 1938 a total of 1,000 vacant positions opened throughout the 
state. 97   However the budget cuts of 1937 and 1938 ensured that there would simply 
never be enough jobs open to accommodate all individuals receiving direct relief. This 
criticism was popular with liberals supportive of expanded relief expenditures and 
increased deficit spending. 
By 1939, Congressional restrictions on federal relief spending and policies 
generated discontent and unrest throughout upstate New York.  In 1939 conservatives in 
Congress set out to “fix” the WPA.  Opponents of the program sought to alter the WPA 
in such a manner that would minimize those elements of the organization they found 	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most objectionable. On a long list of complaints, highest among conservatives’ concerns 
were the WPA’s continued deficit spending and perceived “leftist” tendencies, 
particularly in the arts programs, investigated by the infamous Dies Committee of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee.98  Following a series of smaller restrictive 
pieces of legislation passed over the course of the spring of 1939 on June 30th, 1939, 
President Roosevelt signed into law the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 1939, 
setting aside $1,755,600,000 for all federal relief activities.99  The ERAA of 1939 not 
only greatly reduced federal disbursements for relief, it provided $1,298,825,000 less 
than the 1938’s appropriation, but the act presented major changes for the 
administration.100  First and foremost, the act, along with April legislation providing for 
the reorganization of relief, eliminated the WPA as an independent agency.101  The 
Works Progress Administration was rebranded the Work Projects Administration, and 
placed under the auspices of the newly formed “Federal Works Agency.”102  While this 
move had little real effect on the WPA’s day-to-day functions, the act eliminated the 
PWA and placed more of an emphasis on the WPA as opposed to Harold Ickes’ Interior 
Department.103  More important for upstate operations, however were substantive 
changes made to the basic fabric of the WPA.  The ERAA eliminated the Federal Theater 
Project, abolished the prevailing wage scale, and required all WPA employees to sign an 
affidavit stating their loyalty to the United States.104  The act also placed heavy 
restrictions on the participation of aliens in the country from participating in the program 	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or taking work on any WPA site. While the FTP was never a large presence in the upstate 
region and by 1940 not a single Nazi or Communist was found among upstate WPA rolls, 
the provision providing for the abolition of the prevailing wage scale stirred dissent 
amongst WPA workers across the country.105   
For most skilled workers, and even some unskilled workers, the prevailing wage 
system in place since 1935 enabled laborers to earn the equivalent of a month’s pay (at 
relief wages) in little over a week of WPA work.  In replacing the prevailing wage system 
with a firm security wage, the ERAA created a situation whereby the weekly work hours 
of the vast majority of WPA workers increased dramatically, with some individuals 
finding their hours doubling or even triping.106  As a result, in mid-July work stoppages 
froze projects across the entire nation, with approximately 100,000 workers leaving work 
sites nationwide.107  New York workers were no exception to the walk-out trend.  Across 
the state, an approximate total of 4,000 WPA employees participated in walk-out 
demonstrations.108 In Binghamton, 330 workers were suspended and 94 given dismissal 
notices following mass walk-outs on the city’s own WPA projects.109  Workers carried 
signs protesting the cuts to wages and general appropriations offered by the ERAA. “We 
Want Work, Not Relief!” “We Demand the right to work!” “Down With The Woodrum 
Bill!”110  In Rochester, 1,000 workers walked off job sites and signed a petition directed 
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at Congress to return to the prevailing wage system.111  Elsewhere in New York, one 
particularly violent group of protesters attempted to hang an effigy of Representative 
Taber, the Syracuse Republican Congressman who had an integral role in developing the 
1939 legislation.112  In addition to heated political speech from workers on the left, 1939 
saw accusations of political manipulation arise from the right.  On March 21st a 
Republican WPA official from Rochester reported to the Rochester Leader-Republican 
that he and one other administrative employee of the Rochester WPA had been fired from 
their positions because they refused to issue a blanket discharge of all Republican 
foremen on projects active in the city.  In his statement, the administrator accused Robert 
G. Hoffman, Area WPA director for Rochester; Phillip Dailey, Secretary of the Monroe 
County Democratic Committee, and Lester Herzog of providing a list of all Republican 
foremen in the city and supplying orders to fire all still active on projects.113  While 
charges filed with the WPA Investigation Department in Washington from Rochester 
never culminated in any formal disciplinary action, when combined with the unrest 
inspired by the 1939 ERAA it is evident that the year of 1939 was tumultuous for the 
upstate WPA.  Despite indications that most projects continued normally and evidence 
showing continued work on storm sewers, sewing rooms, road repair and historical 
indexing in 1939, the fact remains that the 1939 ERAA force upstate workers to a literal 
breaking point over issues of fundamental issues of pay and hours as a result of lowered 
relief spending appropriations.114  
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If 1939 was objectively the worst year for the WPA in upstate New York, 1940 
and 1941 provided the rebound needed for the administration to regain its footing.  On 
September 1st, 1939, Nazi forces invaded Poland, and thus began the first substantial 
phase of World War II.  Over the next year Nazi troops blasted their way through 
Western Europe, annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia prior to Poland.  By May 29th, 
Germany had secured the surrender of Belgium, by June 14th; France had fallen.115  As 
Britain became more and more Europe’s last hope for survival, President Roosevelt 
began to think more and more about military spending.   
Following Hitler’s annexation of Austria in March of 1938, President Roosevelt 
sent Harry Hopkins and Los Angeles WPA administrator Lieutenant Colonel Donald H. 
Connolly on a secret mission to the West Coast of the United States to examine the 
capabilities of American aircraft manufacturers.116  Unnerved by observed inadequacy in 
the United States aerial capacity, Roosevelt began planning at that early stage how to 
increase military readiness in the still overwhelmingly isolationist U.S.  Limited by the 
Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937, as well as by provisions written into the WPA’s 
founding legislation that “no part of the appropriations… shall be used for munitions, 
warships, or military or naval material,” Roosevelt’s quest to utilize the WPA for military 
readiness was an uphill battle from the beginning.117  In the President’s 1938/1939 
budget, he requested funds for a “two-ocean navy” so to defend both coasts of the United 
States.  The Congress acquiesced, but refused to add 8,000 warplanes to the order, seeing 
the request as a purely aggressive move.118  After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, 
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Roosevelt began holding regular communication with British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill. According to Churchill, by late 1939 the situation in Europe grew direr by the 
day.  The British, should they stand a chance in fighting off the Nazi blitzkrieg, especially 
the Luftwaffe, would require aid in the form of “ships, planes, and anti-aircraft guns and 
ammunition.”119 By the time Germany had subdued Belgium, President Roosevelt 
secured from Congress $1.75 billion for the creation of a standing military including 
50,000 planes, with a production of 50,000 more every year as well as a vast increase in 
U.S. factory output to “turn out quickly infinitely greater supplies.”120  And while 
restrictions existed against using the WPA to specifically buy or manufacture armaments, 
no restrictions existed to prevent the organization from building military facilities under 
the sponsorship of the armed services.  In fact, by June 20th of 1935, the Army’s 
Quartermaster Corps had received $1,215,722 dollars for WPA work on its bases across 
the nation.121  For Roosevelt, the WPA was the perfect means to boost military 
production.	  	  	  
For upstate communities, the rise in war production meant a great change in the 
character of the WPA and a new boost in specific relief projects.  For instance, on July 
30th of 1940 the Buffalo Municipal Airport improvement project was placed on the U.S. 
War Department’s “priority list” ranking and positioning projects considered to be of 
high importance to national security.  As a city, Buffalo was in dire straits financially as a 
result of unsustainable sponsor costs imposed by late-stage federal relief appropriation 
arrangements.  In April of 1940, a drastic curtailment of the city’s WPA activities was 
ordered for the 1940-1941 fiscal year, whereby five proposed projects were rejected due 	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to the city’s inability to produce sponsor’s shares even for projects that were at that point 
ongoing.122  But as a result of the city’s financial situation and due in part to the 
program’s position on the War Department Priority List, by September Buffalo had 
received an outright grant of $320,951 for the improvement of the airport’s 
Northeast/Southwest runway, the only municipality to be granted such a grant in the 
U.S.123 In mid-September the U.S. announced the prioritization of airport improvement 
nationwide as a national defense initiatives, and in November of 1940 the WPA 
announced a measure of blanket priority for all projects designated by the Army or Navy 
as “vital to national defense. “  This so-called “blanket priority” enabled relaxed 
requirements on sponsor contributions, work hours, monthly wages, and use of WPA 
funds; removed the requirement of individual applications for national defense projects; 
and applied to projects including airports, roads to military posts, national guard 
facilities, reserve officer camps, National Strategic Warehousing, and health/sanitation 
work surrounding camps.124  As national defense spending increased and WPA projects 
intertwined with national defense escalated in number and size, spending on other WPA 
projects, less attractive due to higher sponsor costs, decreased substantially.  In Buffalo, 
following the full funding of the Buffalo City Municipal Airport project, the city 
cancelled nine projects lined up for the next fiscal year, choosing to rein in spending and 
focus on the reduction of current debts.125 Like Buffalo, upstate industrial towns dotting 
the rural and urban areas of the state found themselves perfect fits for new industrial 
WPA jobs.  Racked with debt from changes in WPA spending and funding policies over 	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the preceding two years, upstate communities seized on the opportunity for new work 
relief projects with a vastly reduced price tag as compared to standard WPA pursuits.  
1941 witnessed the simultaneous rebirth of the WPA as a vital piece of the war 
industry puzzle and slow decline of the program overall as war production eventually 
supplanted it.  At year’s beginning, many individuals within New York State doubted that 
defense work would ever completely end the WPA.  In a March 25th editorial in the 
Times Herald of Olean, New York entitled “Beautiful Dream of Defense Boom ending 
WPA—Just a Dream,” local commentator Peter Edison asserted that while huge defense 
spending did indeed help unemployment, the spending was far too concentrated in areas 
without high WPA employment to ever make a serious dent in the size of overall WPA 
enrollment.  With 80% of workers on the WPA living in areas receiving 20% of 
government defense contracts in 1941, it is easy to see Mr. Edison’s point.126  However, 
what Edison overlooked was how eager unemployed persons would be to travel to jobs 
not in their immediate areas. By mid-year upstate New York had become one of the 
exceptional regions of production that Edison had discussed.  However, in addition to 
upstate workers, unemployed individuals from regions like New York City and Long 
Island traveled and found steady in factories throughout the upstate region.127  All across 
New York, relief contracts in industrial centers created massive employment 
opportunities for individuals of all training levels.  For example, in 1940 Savage Arms of 
Utica pledged 4,000 new hires within a year after receiving a $27,166,283 government 
contract for the manufacture of machine guns and small arms, $17,600,000 of which was 
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furnished by the U.S. government.128  By June 9th Edison had changed his tune.  In a new 
editorial entitled “WPA Dollars Are Now Rolling For Defense,” he celebrated the 
potential of defense spending to greatly reduce WPA rolls across the state.129  
With the Lend-Lease Act signed into law in March of 1941, U.S. production of 
military materials skyrocketed.  In upstate New York, war production in Syracuse 
expanded to include over 22 factories, each operating at over 43% the production level of 
the previous year, and each pledging to produce even more than they had already done 
while dedicating of 50 to 100% of their facilities to defense work.130  In July the New 
York WPA began to offer paid training courses in lieu of project work for skills badly 
needed in defense industries.131  Administrator Lester Herzog estimated that in the year 
the WPA would provide training for 20,000 men and women in New York, paying a 
whopping $20 weekly for the training.132  Simultaneous to this surge in employment 
opportunities, the WPA dialed down its activities throughout the state. In June the 
national relief budget was slashed again, this time to $885,905,000.133 In Syracuse, 10 
administrative officers were cut from WPA payrolls, and the total administrative force 
statewide was cut from 25,000 in 1936 to a mere 13,000 on June 18th.134  Later that 
month, the state’s quota of workers was cut from 103,233 to 77,000.135   
On December 7th, 1941, the United States Naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii was 
attacked by a detachment of Japanese bombers and fighter planes.  At 2:30 PM Eastern 
time on December 8th, Japan declared war on the United States.  At 4:00 PM, the 	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responded with a declaration of war of its own, launching the U.S into full-scale conflict 
Japan.136 Several days later, Germany joined in Japan’s declaration of war against the 
United States, prompting a retaliatory declaration from President Roosevelt.137 With 
recruitment centers remaining open 24 hours a day in order to accommodate an 
anticipated influx of volunteers, across upstate New York young men flocked to enlist for 
military service.138   
Swelling participation in the armed forces was not the only change to occur following 
the U.S. declaration of war on Japan and the Axis powers.  The United States’ official 
entrance into World War II also resulted in a dramatic surge in production.  Many of 
upstate New York’s largest arms producers reported by mid-June of 1942 that in the 
seven months since Pearl Harbor production had increased as much as 50%.139 Likewise, 
U.S involvement in the war boosted WPA operations far beyond what had been seen just 
prior to December of 1941.  By the spring of 1942, work in New York State defense 
factories accelerated to a pace so quick that women in WPA training programs were 
placed in factory jobs prior to their graduation from their respective programs.140  
Moreover, in Syracuse and other cities, all non-defense WPA projects were halted at their 
current levels of completion, weekly hours were raised from 30 to 48, and war production 
became the only concern of the WPA in New York State.141  
By 1942, select upstate Republicans, tired of the WPA’s continued existence, lobbied 
on the national level for the complete abolition of the WPA not just in New York State, 
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but also across the entire country.  Republicans and conservative Democrats contended 
that the administration was created as an instrument of relief, catalyzed by economic 
depression and designed to ease the stress of exceptional unemployment resulting from 
the collapse of business enterprises nationwide.  As such, those opposed to the program’s 
continuation argued that wartime industries had all but erased any remaining employment 
deficit that might have existed when the WPA began in 1935. Returning as a chief critic 
of the WPA’s continuation among upstate representatives, Syracuse Republican 
Congressman John Taber sat that year as a ranking minority member on the House 
Appropriations Committee during deliberations over the 1942 appropriation for the 
Administration.  Rep. Taber, seeking to “wipe out” a proposed $280,000,000 
appropriation for the administration for the coming fiscal year, claimed his district had 
neither depression nor a severe unemployment problem.142  Speaking at length on the 
issue, Taber asked the House of Representatives if they were supportive of “further 
reduction or the possible elimination of the Works Projects Administration eventually,” 
why should they object to doing so immediately.  Speaking of the economic situation in 
1942, Taber remarked that “farmers are crying aloud for help, demand for labor in the 
factories is going up by leaps and bounds… millions of our boys are being taken for the 
armed forces of our country… and every dollar of credit that the United States has is 
needed for the carrying out of the war program to bring this country to Victory.”143  
Extending the conditions of New York’s 36th to the nation as a whole, Taber contended 
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that individuals then on WPA payrolls could, should they be of “a mind to,” easily find 
work in “war industries, on farms, or in plants producing essential civilian needs.”144  
For the overwhelming majority of upstate industrial centers, Representative Taber’s 
comments were not entirely off the mark.  However, his calculations did not account for 
the fact that upstate New York’s production rate was exceptional.  According to modern 
examinations of New York State contributions to industrial war production during World 
War II, the upstate region of New York represented a “needier production zone” to which 
labor from New York City, a region which did not ”receive war work proportionate to the 
size of its market,” migrated in order to find employment.145 This influx of workers from 
New York City demonstrated just how high the volume of available employment was in 
the upstate area in 1942.  As such, the Congressman questioned the logic behind the 
continuation of a program set up to provide jobs for the unemployed when the job market 
was exploding with jobs as it never had before.  With the relief load dropped 50% in the 
year preceding June of 1942, Taber argued that the only reason he could see that the 
Roosevelt administration would desire the continuation of the WPA was for the 
continued employment of program employees loyal to the president.146  Taber’s 
statements in front of Congress on June 10th, 1942 were typical of those articulated by 
opponents to the WPA. 
By 1943, sixty-five percent of U.S. War Finance Company subsidies earmarked for 
the state of New York were delivered to areas of the state outside of the New York 
metropolitan region, Suffolk and Nassau counties, with a whopping twenty-nine percent 
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landing in Niagara and Erie counties.147 In Taber’s own Syracuse, Mac-Law Tool & 
Aircraft parts and Bristol Laboratories (a large manufacturer of penicillin) established 
operations on the outskirts of the town.  These operations attracted so many workers that 
by 1941 only eighteen percent of workers were employed within a half-mile of the city’s 
downtown area. 148 A twenty-two percent shift from levels recorded in 1913, this statistic 
displays the power of the draw that war industries had in upstate New York.149   By 1942 
large plants within the city were desperate for new hires to “keep critical war production 
rolling.”150  By October 1942 large manufacturing enterprises ranging from Remington-
Rand to Halcomb Steel placed ads in local papers seeking new hires for work in the “war 
production” sector.  Workers both skilled and unskilled, male and female were asked to 
apply to a large number of job openings in the area. 151 One 1942 ad offered positions for 
toolmakers, cutter grinders, turret lathe men, set up men, deep hole drillers, profilers, 
milling machine operators, drill press operators and surface grinders, while another right 
beside it listed work openings for “machinists, electricians, millwrights” and general 
laborers.152  Taber’s remarks regarding his district were not exaggerated.   
Beyond Syracuse, the entire upstate region found the war a boon for a large portion of 
its regional industries.  A mere fifty-five miles east of Syracuse, the city of Utica 
transformed into a powerhouse of industrial output.  Home to Savage Arms Company—
manufacturer of Thompson submachine guns, Utica Cutlery—fabricator of bayonets and 
the Bossert Company—a large producer of artillery shells, Utica evolved into a high 
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output military industrial center.153 By August of 1942 Savage Arms had earned “the 
joint Army-Navy production award” for “outstanding performance of war work.”   
In cases like those in Syracuse and Utica, high government subsidies to upstate 
industrial centers offered a war-spurred federal stimulus which in essence still provided 
such municipalities with government funded employment, just jobs that were officially 
part of the private sector (not Works Projects Administration) and which directly boosted 
industrial growth.154  In communities like Canajoharie, located 42 miles west of Utica, 
empty manufacturing spaces were filled with new war industry operations.  At Beech-
Nut, a food packaging company active in the community since the late 19th century, 2,000 
workers were employed making K-rations for consumption by troops in both the 
European and Pacific theaters.155  In agricultural communities, food production all but 
erased the lag in demand for fairly priced fruits, vegetables and meats.  In Steuben 
County, Prattsburg and Wheeler were said to not be able to produce potatoes quick 
enough to fill increased war-time demand. In counties like Erie and St. Lawrence as well 
as in towns like North Collins, Brant, and the Hudson Valley; wartime labor shortages 
required the hiring of 140,000 men and women to aid in the harvest and processing of 
poultry, berries, raspberries, apples, maple syrup, and all varieties of vegetables.156 
As the rate of war-production continued to increase in New York, the need for the 
WPA gradually declined.  In December of 1942, President Roosevelt ordered the gradual 
liquidation of the entire WPA throughout the nation.  In New York, the President’s order 
meant the dismissing of 7,500 project workers and 100 administrative employees across 	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the upstate region.157  Select projects, like war production and the last of the large sewage 
works, would carry on into 1943, but for the rest of New York’s WPA employees, the 
President’s order meant a permanent end to employment with the administration, 
including 455 in the Syracuse area alone.158  No longer relevant and no longer justifiable 
to swelling conservative forces in Congress, on April 26th, 1943, the WPA closed its 
doors in New York for good.  Little over two months before the nation did the same.159 
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Conclusions 
 Extending back to the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration, work relief 
in upstate New York has a rich and complicated history.  From 1931 through 1935 the 
state, and in later years with the help of the federal government, crafted a high 
functioning system of relief lauded and modeled by federal authorities.  When the 
economic fortune of New York began to falter at the end of 1934 and through 1935, the 
Federal Works Progress Administration provided upstate New York with much needed 
relief from the crushing financial costs of shouldering both home and work relief 
expenditures.  From 1935 to 1936 the WPA crafted a flexible organization capable of 
adhering to the unique needs of upstate‘s diverse population and competent at completing 
its task of lifting work relief costs off of the shoulders of municipalities.  While problems 
did arise through 1936, 1937, and 1938, most were small issues inconsequential to the 
administration’s accomplishment of broader economic goals.  However, sustained 
cutbacks from 1937 to 1939 created a situation whereby gains made in 1936 were in 
some locations reversed by 1939, with relief costs back loaded onto local welfare 
structures once again.  However, the rising tide of war production between 1939 and 
1943 allowed for the revitalization of the WPA with new military subsidies, and allowed 
an entirely competent program crippled in ability by spending cuts to once again become 
viable.  Through 1942 and 1943 still increasing wartime spending allowed the WPA to 
quietly fade out of existence in New York.  
 Despite this slow fade into obscurity, the physical and social rewards of the long 
term public investment of those projects begun in 1935 and developed through all the 
years of the WPA have reverberated throughout upstate New York in the almost 71 years 
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since the program’s end.  After 1943, a large number of the WPA’s projects across the 
state remained active in the communities that sponsored them.  Recreational facilities 
constructed under program direction have continued to offer easily accessible public 
spaces for the benefit of their localities.  For example, in Fort Plain, the Municipal 
Bandstand erected by two WPA workers in 1936 (Figure 1), as of March of 2014, 




Figure 1: Completed Fort Plain Bandstand, 1936. (Lester W Herzog. WPA In The Capital 
District. (New York: Works Progress Administration, 1936) 
 
 
Scarcely changed in appearance, the Bandstand has endured as a central fixture of town 
life.  Each summer community organizations utilize the structure for fairs and town-wide 
celebrations.  Each December, the village DPW dresses eves of the stand with holiday 
lights, visible in Figure 2, that remain hanging until April.   
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 Figure 2: Fort Plain Bandstand, March 10, 2014. 
 
 
Similarly, the Amsterdam Municipal Golf Course constructed by the WPA between 1935 
and 1938 in March of 2014 remains open and active.  Citizens of Amsterdam recognize 
the project as an integral part of their community.  In a Letter To The Editor in the 
Amsterdam Recorder on September 21, 2013, an anonymous city resident characterized 
the course as “an important part of our city’s past and part of its future,” a remark which 
testifies to the enduring value of similar projects.1  
 Additionally, artwork crafted under the auspices of the WPA has also remained in 
the post-WPA era.  In July of 1975, the town of LaFayette staged a production of the 
WPA New York State Plays Project work “The Cardiff Giant” as part of a yearlong 
Bicentennial celebration in the Community.2  1985, city officials in Pine Plains 
endeavored to obtain from private hands “two historic WPA paintings of Pine Plains” in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Letter To The Editor,” Amsterdam Recorder (online), September 21, 2013. 
2 “Cardiff Giant Pageant In LaFayette in July,” The Tully Independent, June 5, 1975, pg. 12.	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order to bring them “back into public fold.”  According to city officials, the works had 
been “erroneously… given to former school employees” of the Pine Planes Central 
School District some time after the end of the program.  The city’s “Little Nine Partners 
Historical Society,” working for over a year, eventually secured the paintings for the 
public.  In a report on the events, the Pine Plains Register Herald on November 14, 1985 
claimed that the paintings were “historic bounty” that, for the community, “provided an 
excellent opportunity to make local history come alive” in the town.3  
 Less visibly, infrastructural updates made by the WPA remain in 2014 an integral 
part of many municipal systems.  Bridges, sewers, water mains and roads constructed by 
the administration have since the program’s end provided a firm base for further 
improvements and updates to town and county infrastructures throughout the past 70 
years.  According to an unnamed Amsterdam city engineer, a “large percentage” of the 
city’s bridges, sewer systems and water systems are still in 2014 built on work initially 
conducted by Works Progress Administration employees.4  In Fort Plain, in some 
locations WPA stamps are still visible on retaining walls and sidewalks across the village 
(see Figure 3). These projects, along with the recreational facilities and works of art that 
exist alongside them, attest to the WPA’s legacy of successful long term public 
investment and to the initial quality and applicability of the projects when they were 
constructed between 1935 and 1943.  
 While this thesis provides ample evidence for the success of well-funded work 
programs in the upstate New York between 1931 and 1943, many questions still remain 
regarding the place of work relief in the upstate region.  As of February of 2014 the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “Our Heritage,” Pine Plains Register-Herald, November 14, 1985, pg. 4.  
4 City Engineer, Interview by Maxwell M. Prime, March 12, 2014. 
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national unemployment rate as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics hovers at 
approximately 6.7%.5  While this number is nowhere near the national unemployment 
rate at the peak of the Great Depression, it still accounts for 10.5 million Americans who 
are out of work and largely unable to find steady employment.  In order to better 
ascertain the potential benefit of a modern public work relief program in the upstate 
region, a comparison of economic conditions in 2014 against those that necessitated 
federal intervention in 1935.  Fond memories of WPA work that persist in the upstate 
region have already tipped some segments of the public towards support for a WPA-like 
work program.  In an editorial entitled “Making Use of The Unemployed” featured in the 
Amsterdam Recorder on April 20, 2010, an Amsterdam resident professed his belief that 
a program similar to the WPA “could provide a model for a similar effort relevant to 
today’s needs. Whether he is right is appropriate work for future studies on work relief in 
the area.  This thesis, however, can only conclude that between 1931 and 1943, work 
relief endeavors in upstate New York, when well funded, were relatively successful in 
easing the financial burden placed on local government by relief, creating diverse 
employment opportunities appropriate for the varied character of the upstate workforce, 
and in executing projects of the utmost short-term and long-term use for the communities 
that sponsored them—a solid informational base for any future examinations.  
 
   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “The Employment Situation—February 2014,” March 7, 2014.  
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 Figure 3: WPA Retaining Wall and Sidewalk in Fort Plain, NY 
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• The Amsterdam Evening Recorder: 1935. 
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• The Syracuse Herald Journal: 1941. 
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Appendix II 
• The extent of the Farm-To-Market roadwork in upstate New York in 1936 was 
greater than described above. Montgomery County had extensive farm-to-market 
road work, generating 15 miles of roads including work on Country Roads and 
gravel roads in Minden.  Schenectady County implemented the “Schenectady 
County Roads Project.”  Designed to aid farmers and dairymen the project forged 
roads through Glenville, Niskayuna, Princetown and Duanesburg.  In 
Cohoes/Watervliet, Colombia Street was extended directly across rural “open 
country” to connect with the Albany-Saratoga Trunk Line in order to make the 
route safer to travel.  In Colombia County, 40 to 50 miles of Farm-To Market 
roads were built or repaired through Hillsdale, Claverack, Kinderhook, Stockport, 
Stuyvesant, Ghent, Ancram, Chatham, and Germantown.  The town of Pitcher in 
Chenango County, Roseboom in Otsego County, Delaware in Sullivan County, 
and Sidney in Delaware County all increased their farm-to-market road mileage 
through incremental works developing as little as 1,0000 feet of road at a time.  
o Microfilm, “Works Progress Administration Central Office Starting 
Target, Reel 10, Reference Card Location Project File E.R.A. Acts 1935-
1938,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York 
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o Lester Herzog, WPA In The Capital District, (New York: Works Progress 
Administration, 1936);  
o Lester Herzog, WPA In The Susquehanna Country, (New York: Works 
Progress Administration, 1936). 
 
Appendix III 
• Literacy Courses—182 centers, 2,360 monthly attendees.   
• “Bread and Butter” Courses—600 centers, 16,200 monthly attendees.  
• Vocational Courses—867 centers, 18,000 monthly attendees 
• Emergency Collegiate Centers—21 cities, 245 teachers, 2,356 enrollees 
• Recreational Classes: 628 centers, 745 teachers, 4,900 classes, 350,000 
individuals reached statewide. 
o Lester Herzog, Women's and Professional Projects, (New York: Works 
Progress Administration, 1936). 
 
Appendix IV: 
• “State Education Department Nursery Schools”- 1,200 children of relief families 
from the ages of 2 to 5 clothed, fed, examined by nurses, and provided pre-school 
education.  A large number of relief children were afflicted by debilitating 
diseases like anemia, scurvy, and rickets, thus WPA teachers and nurses bathed 
students, disbursed a pint and a half of milk each day, eggs three times per week, 
noontime lunch, snack twice a day, gave daily health inspections, fed children a 
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spoon of cod-liver oil, multiple portions of food if requested, and even sent home 
child-specific health information to students’ parents. 
o Lester Herzog, Women's and Professional Projects, (New York: Works 
Progress Administration, 1936).   
 
• “Historical Records Survey”- A federally sponsored project employing 400 
researchers statewide in the examination of state, county, and local archives as 
well as historical manuscripts from private libraries, churches, and businesses.  
This program continued in many areas work already begun under the TERA, as is 
seen in Montgomery County, where a project creating “The Department of 
History and Archives of Montgomery County” was established in 1934.  The 
Montgomery County Project was taken over by the WPA on November 19th, 
1935, and continued through August 1938.  In its work, the project “compiled and 
bound many volumes of town, village, church and miscellaneous records; rebound 
books in the County Law Library and hundreds of volumes of other records in the 
Department on the Third floor; indexed and filed thousands of documents 
pertaining to the early records of Montgomery county as well as a great many 
maps and surveys of lands within the present boundaries of the County.   
o Letter, Edward J. Sheehan County Archivist to Board Of Supervisors of 
Montgomery County, Dec. 1, 1938. HF126, A-32.  Montgomery County 
Historical Archives, Fonda, New York. 
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• “Federal Music Program”- A program to provide work for musicians on relief and 
with which to entertain the general public.  Music performed ranged from the 
work of classical composers to contemporary dance numbers, and was played at 
engagements including public concerts in Albany, Rensselaer and Schenectady 
counties, hospital performances, and private arrangements in orphanages and 
tubercular sanitaria.  In mid-1936, Albany’s orchestra employed 25 musicians 
from relief rolls.   
o Lester Herzog, Women's and Professional Projects, (New York: Works 











WPA Plaque on Municipal Bandstand, Fort Plain, NY, March 10, 2014. 
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Amsterdam Municipal Golf Course, March 12, 2014. 
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